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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 For Israelis, religious affiliation means much more than an expression of 
freedom of conscience.  Religious identity can also serve as a connecting factor 
between the self and a legal system.1  A person’s religion in Israel will serve to 
identify the governing law in a number of family law matters just as the place 
where a tort has been committed, the place of a contract, or the place of domicile 
can serve as factors identifying the governing law of a certain relationship.  The 
most evident example of this is the law governing matters of marriage and divorce: 
Israeli citizens are governed by their religious community court and religious 
community law in such matters.2  This reality of having one’s personal law, instead 
                                                 
 * Vice-Dean and holder of the Edward S. Silver Chair in Civil Procedure, Faculty of Law, the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. LL.B., Bar Ilan University, LL.M., George Washington University; LL.D., 
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An earlier version of this article that dealt with the multicultural aspects of religious accommodations 
in Israel was presented at a conference organized by the Center of Comparative Constitutionalism of the 
University of Chicago Law School in January 2004. I would like to thank the organizers of the conference, 
Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein, for inviting me, and together with them to also thank all of the other 
participants of the conference for their helpful and valuable comments. A more advanced version of the 
article was presented at a conference organized by the Minerva Center for Human Rights of the Faculty of 
Law of the Hebrew University and the Faculty of Law of the University of Heidelberg held in Heidelberg, 
Germany in July 2005.  I would also like to thank a number of colleagues and friends who made comments 
at the last stage of writing the article, especially Barak Medina, Daniel Statman and Steven Wilf and to 
Sharon Shakargy and Ehud Brosh for their excellent research assistance.  
 1 See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. 
L. REV. 101 (2000). 
 2 See Amnon Rubinstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 ISR. L. REV. 380, 384-88 (1967) [hereinafter 
Rubinstein, Law and Religion]; see also  Asher Maoz, Religious Human Rights in the State of Israel, in 
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES: LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 349, 355 (Johan D. van der 
Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Maoz, Religious Human Rights]; Asher Maoz, 
Enforcement of Religious Courts Judgments Under Israeli Law, 33 J. CHURCH & ST . 473 (1991). 
This also means that when litigating matters of marriage and divorce before the religious courts, the 
parties need to abide by the procedure devised by that particular court that could also be influenced by 
religious notions. This is particularly relevant to rules dealing with the capacity of witnesses to testify 
before a religious court, rules that are able to explicitly discriminate on the basis of gender and the religious 
affiliation of the witness.  In this respect, local rules dealing with the conflict of jurisdictional authority of 
the different religious courts, or between a religious court and the civil court, resemble to a great extent the 
methodology applied in the sphere of private international law. As it is well known in the teachings of this 
latter discipline, forums follow their own local law (the lex fori) in matters of procedure even when the 
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of the state’s territorial law, governing certain family law matters is in essence a 
legacy from the Ottoman Empire’s millet system. 3 
¶2 However, control of marriage and divorce is only one of many other spheres 
in which religion is of regulatory significance.  Historically, religion in Israel 
dictated policies concerning official holidays and days of rest, public education in 
schools and higher education, public transportation, burials, the handling of 
cemeteries and even regulations of the importation of meat.4  As a result, it is 
widely admitted that Israel does not exhibit separation between religion and state.5 
¶3 Nonetheless, the question arises whether this entanglement of religion and 
state is of the same nature and to the same extent in all the religious communities 
that exist in Israel. 6  The answer this article provides is in the negative.  Though 
there is no separation between religion and state in Israel, separation does exist in 
the nature and justification for the existing religious accommodations of the Jewish 
majority on the one hand and those of the Palestinian-Arab minority on the other 
hand.  The article asserts that because of the Jewish nature of the State of Israel, 
almost all of the apparatuses governing the “religion and state” debate have 
centered around Judaism.  Religious accommodations granted to the Palestinian-
Arab minority, on the other hand, were relegated to a separate realm—that of 
minority (group) accommodations.  The result of this disparate treatment has led to 
a “paradigm of separateness” in religion and state relations in Israel.  The political 
and legal environment in Israel has also reinforced this “paradigm of separateness,” 
especially in light of the national conflict that exists between the Palestinian-Arab 
minority in Israel and the state itself. 
¶4 The article begins by giving an overview of the diverse nature of the 
population in Israel both in terms of its national composition and in terms of the 
religious affiliation of its citizens.  This discussion, that takes place in section I, 
also seeks to characterize the type of issues typically dealt with when relating to 
national and religious tensions in Israel.  After observing how entrenched the 
paradigm of separateness is in the religion and state debate, section II of the article 
discusses in detail how this paradigm was constructed.  Section III identifies two 
major forces that have worked to re-enforce the paradigm of separateness ove r the 
years:  external factors related to the overall Israeli policy towards the Palestinian-
Arab minority, and internal factors related to intra Palestinian-Arab social and 
political dynamics.  Section IV of the article highlights the fact that the paradigm of 
separateness as identified here has normative implications as well. 
                                                                                                                                                 
governing law (the lex causae) happens to be the law of a foreign country. See IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS 
LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 177-98 (1975). 
 3 Amnon Rubinstein, State and Religion in Israel, 2 J. CONTEMP . HIST . 107, 111-12 (1967) [hereinafter 
Rubinstein, State and Religion].  
 4 See THE STATE OF ISRAEL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR): COMBINED INITIAL AND FIRST PERIODIC REPORT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
226-45 (1998) [hereinafter ISRAELI ICCPR REPORT ]. 
 5 David Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 39, 48 (Amos Shapira 
& Keren C. DeWitt-Arrar eds., 1995); Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM. J. COMP . L. 185, 
192 (1987); Pnina Lahav, The Status of Women in Israel – Myth and Reality, 22 AM. J. COMP . L. 107 
(1974). 
 6 Reference to Israel as made in this article relates to the pre-1967 borders of the State of Israel. 
Consequently, the discussion does not relate to East Jerusalem, or to any other territory occupied by Israel 
during the Six-Day War. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
¶5 Israel is a diverse country and nearly one-fifth of the total population, 
consisting of about 1.2 million citizens, is Palestinian-Arab, while the rest of the 
population is  predominantly Jewish. 7  The religious composition of the non-Jewish 
population is made-up of Moslems, Christians and Druze.8  Moreover, within the 
different religious groups themselves, there are a number of various factions.  The 
Jewish community is divided into secular, traditional, and religious groups,9 with 
the latter containing a well-established Ultra-Orthodox camp.10  In addition, Reform 
and Conservative Judaism have gained force recently creating new challenges to 
the dominant Orthodox establishment.11  The Christian population is divided into 
ten recognized religious congregations,12 and each has its own body of institutions 
including a court system.  In some cases these congregations even have substantial 
ties to foreign governments.13 
¶6 The existence of different national and religious groups in Israel has been a 
constant source of tension.  On the national level, the most obvious tension is 
between the Palestinian-Arab minority and the Jewish majority.   Moreover, since 
Israel as a state is officially defined on national, ethnic and religious grounds as a 
Jewish state, this national conflict has, in many cases, also turned into a conflict 
between the Palestinian-Arab minority and the Israeli establishment as a whole.14  
Underlying this national tension is of course the overall Israeli-Arab (Palestinian) 
conflict that has left both sides not only with a great amount of anguish and grief 
                                                 
 7 The total population of Israel was estimated for the year 2001 to be 6,439,000, out of which 1,227,500 
(18.76%) is Palestinian-Arab. See 53 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL 2002, tbl. 2.1 (Jerusalem: 2002). 
The full tables are available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnatonenew.htm. Though it should be noted that the 
Palestinian-Arab population in the official statistics of Israel include the Palestinian-Arab population of 
East Jerusalem as well. 
 8 The Jewish population is estimated for the year 2001 to be 4,990,200 (77.50%), the Moslem 987,300 
(15.33%), the Christian Arab 112,200  (1.74%), other Christians 24,600 (0.38%), Druze 105,000 (1.63%) 
and a total of 216,200 (3.35%) is unclassified. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT , supra note 7. An additional 
recognized religious community is Baha’i. The official statistics do not have any specific category for the 
Baha’i, but their number barely exceeds a couple of thousand. 
 9 See SHLOMIT LEVY ET AL., A PORTRAIT OF ISRAELI JEWRY, BELIEFS, OBSERVATIONS, AND VALUES 
AMNG ISRAELI JEWS 5-6 (2002). 
 10 GAD BARZILAI, COMMUNITIES AND THE LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURES OF LEGAL IDENTITIES 10-11, 
55-56 (2003). 
 11 See Ephraim Tabory, The Israel Reform and Conservative Movements and the Market for Liberal 
Judaism, in JEWS IN ISRAEL: CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PATTERNS 285 (Uzi Rebhun & 
Chaim I. Waxman eds., 2004). 
 12 MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 3 (1994).    
 13 See URI BIALER, CROSS ON THE STAR OF DAVID: THE CHRISTIAN WORLD IN ISRAEL’S FOREIGN 
POLICY, 1948-1967 (2005); see also  HCJ 963/04 Loiffer v. The Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 
326 (holding that courts in Israel have a limited form of judicial review over government handling of the 
election of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch given the fact the whole subject also implicates Israel’s foreign 
policy). 
 14 See, e.g., JACOB M. LANDAU, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL, A POLITICAL STUDY (1969); ELIA ZURIEK, THE 
PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL: A STUDY IN INTERNAL COLONIALISM (1979); IAN LUSTICK, ARABS IN THE JEWISH 
STATE: ISRAEL’S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL MINORITY (1980); Sammy Smooha & Don Peretz, The Arabs in 
Israel, 26 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 451 (1982); CLAUDE KLEIN, ISRAEL AS A NATION-STATE AND THE PROBLEM 
OF THE ARAB MINORITY: IN SEARCH OF A STATUS (1987); Sammy Smooha, Minority Status in an Ethnic 
Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel, 13 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 389 (1990); JACOB M. 
LANDAU, THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL, 1967-1991: POLITICAL ASPECTS (1993); NADIM N. ROUHANA, 
PALESTINIAN CITIZENS IN AN ETHNIC JEWISH STATE: IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT  (1997). 
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over the loss of so great a number of human lives but also with constitutive national 
narratives.  The Palestinian narrative has stressed the tragic outcome whereby the 
majority of the Palestinian people were deprived of their homeland, and the Jewish 
(Zionist) national narrative has stressed the emancipation of the Jewish people by 
becoming sovereign in a state of their own.15 
¶7 On the religious level, the most apparent field of tension is intra-Jewish, and 
its manifestation is multifaceted.  One of these facets is the application of Jewish 
religious norms, particularly those of the orthodox approach to regulate the 
personal legal status of Jews.  This includes matters pertaining to the law of 
marriage and divorce,16 or in setting the standards in defining who is a Jew, mainly 
for immigration purposes and public records.17  Another facet is the extent to which 
Jewish religious norms should regulate the public domain, such as laws penalizing 
Jewish shop owners who operate their business on the Sabbath or laws prohibiting 
public transportation from operating on the Sabbath. 18  A third facet is the public 
funding of Jewish religious institutions, be they religious councils or school 
systems of the various religious factions.19 
¶8 The secular-religious friction among the Jewish community has frequently 
been the cause of intense debate.20  Protagonists within the secular camp have 
argued against the coercive nature of the religious norms, especially in matters 
pertaining to marriage and divorce, and have persistently called for limiting public 
funding for Jewish religious institutions.  The Jewish religious camp, on the other 
hand, has called for a tolerant stand toward Jewish religious norms and Jewish 
religious institutions, frequently invoking the need to preserve Jewish religious 
heritage and the fostering of Jewish unity. 21  Interestingly, an unofficial pact has 
been reached between political leaders representing both camps, a pact that has 
managed so far to maintain the various religious normative institutions.  Referred to 
in Israel as that of the “status quo,”22 this reality has been challenged over the years, 
                                                 
 15 Yochanan Peres, Ethnic Relations in Israel, 76 AM. J. SOC. 1021, 1028 (1971) (“It is a commonplace 
that the relationship between Israeli Jews and Arabs as ethnic groups has to be understood in the context of 
the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.”); see also  Judith T. Shuval, The Structure and Dilemmas of Israeli 
Pluralism, in THE ISRAELI STATE AND SOCIETY, BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS 216, 229, 233 (Baruch 
Kimmerling ed., 1989). 
 16 Erica R. Clinton, Chains of Marriage: Israeli Women’s Fight for Freedom, 3 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST . 283, 291 (1999).   
 17 See Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 245-47 (1999); Mark J. Altschul, Israel’s Law of Return and the Debate of Altering, 
Repealing, or Maintaining its Present Language, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1352-55 (2002). 
 18 Rubinstein, State and Religion , supra  note 3, at 110-11. 
 19 Stephen Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion in Government Funded Schools in Israel, 26 ISR. L. REV. 
36 (1992). 
 20 See Martin Edelman, A Portion of Animosity: The Politics of the Disestablishment of Religion in 
Israel, 5 ISR. STUD. 204 (2000). 
 21 See GERSHON SHAFIR & YOAV PELED, BEING ISRAELI: THE DYNAMICS OF MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIP  142 
(2002); Patricia J. Woods, Gender and the Reproduction and Maintenance of Group Boundaries, Why the 
“Secular” State Matters to Religious Authorities in Israel, in BOUNDARIES AND BELONGING, STATES AND 
SOCIETIES IN THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE IDENTITIES AND LOCAL PRACTICES 226, 235-42 (Joel S. Migdal ed., 
2004). 
 22 Actually, the status quo agreement precedes the establishment of the State of Israel. It was first 
formulated in a letter on June 19, 1947 by David Ben-Gurion, then the Head of the Jewish Agency, to 
Agudath Israel, an Ultra-Orthodox and an anti-Zionist religious organization, in which an outline was made 
with respect to the attitude to be adopted by the future Jewish state towards religious demands. While the 
Vol. 5:1] Michael M. Karayanni 
45 
making the relationship between Jewish religious institutions and norms with 
secular liberal ideals a persistent matter of debate among all factions of the Jewish 
community. 23 
¶9 Despite its complicated character, the religion and state debate in Israel has 
one additional feature that is rather plain and straightforward.  The discussion paid 
little attention to “religion and state” issues among the Palestinian-Arab minority in 
Israel. Specifically, matters pertaining to public accommodations for non-Jewish 
religious institutions have escaped the sharp scrutiny associated with religion and 
state in Israel in general.  The public dialogue concerning religion and state in 
Israel is often reduced to a conversation about synagogue and state.24 
¶10 This should not be taken to mean that there are no religion and state tensions 
concerning the religious accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab minority, 
whether in terms of government policy toward their religious institutions,25 or in 
terms of the illiberal nature of the norms applied by Palestinian-Arab religious 
communities to their members.26  For indeed there are.  However, the discussion of 
these matters was conducted for the most part as a particular issue within the more 
general topic of the collective status of the Palestinian-Arab minority, as a non-
Jewish minority that came under Israeli rule.  And in this context, the 
accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab religious communities were taken 
to be a form of a minority (group) accommodation that is pluralistic and 
autonomous in nature.27  So if authority is conceded to the Palestinian-Arab 
religious communities giving them power to adjudicate personal status matters of 
                                                                                                                                                 
letter stated that the future state would essentially be a secular state, it nevertheless stated the following 
four guarantees: (a) the Sabbath will be the official day of rest, while the non-Jewish population will be 
entitled to its own days of rest; (b) dietary laws of Kosher food will be observed in any state-owned 
establishment to which Jews resort; (c) the continuation of rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction over personal 
status matters; (d) a separate system of religious schools would be maintained. See Rubinstein, State and 
Religion, supra note 3, at 113. 
 23 See Gerald M. Steinberg, Interpretations of Jewish Tradition on Democracy, Land, and Peace, 43 J. 
CHURCH & ST . 93, 98-101 (2001).     
 24 See Lucy E. Bassli, Note, The Future of Combining Synagogue and State in Israel: What Have We 
Learned in the First 50 Years? , 22 HOUST . J. INT’L L. 477 (2000); Asher Maoz, State and Religion in 
Israel, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE 239, 239 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter Maoz, State and Religion]. 
 25 See ROBERT H. EISENMAN, ISLAMIC LAW IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL (1978); ALISA RUBIN-PELED, 
DEBATING ISLAM IN THE JEWISH STATE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY TOWARD ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN 
ISRAEL (2001). 
 26 See AHARON LAYISH, WOMEN AND ISLAMIC LAW IN A NON-MUSLIM STATE: A STUDY BASED ON 
DECISIONS OF THE SHARI 'A COURT IN ISRAEL (1975); Andrew Trietel, Conflicting Traditions: Muslim 
Shari’a Courts and Marriage Age Regulation in Israel, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403 (1995). 
 27 See Ilan Saban, Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analysis and the Case 
of the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT 'L L. & POL. 885, 900, 942-48, 954-60 (2004) 
(characterizing the religious accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel as a 
“group-differentiated right” and as a “modest form of self-government”); DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL 
STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 163-68 (1990) (discussing the religious organization of the Palestinian-
Arab religious communities under the heading of “group rights”) [hereinafter KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS]; 
see also  Itzhak Zamir, Shivyon Zekhuyot Klapey Aravim be-Israel [Equality of Rights for Arabs in Israel], 9 
MISHPAT U-MIMSHAL 11, 26, 30 (2005) (in Hebrew) (regarding the jurisdiction of Palestinian-Arab 
religious communities to adjudicate matters of marriage and divorce as a group right); 1 AMNON 
RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, HA-MISHPAT HA-HUKATI SHEL MEDINAT YISRAEL [THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL] 429-35 (6th ed. 2005) (in Hebrew) (referring to the religious organization of 
the Palestinian-Arab religious communities as a limited form of self-government).  
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their members, it is conceded because of Israel’s proclaimed democratic norms that 
seek to respect the religious diversity among its non-Jewish religious communities.  
Thus, in terms of normative justification, the religious accommodations for the 
Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel are a continuation of the long-standing Ottoman 
millet system by which minority religions were tolerated by granting leaders of 
religious minorities jurisdictional powers over their members.28  This ontology is 
inherently different from the one that characterizes the religious accommodations 
pertaining to the Jewish majority.  Given the Jewish nature of the State of Israel 
such accommodations were configured as yet another public feature, albeit 
controversial at times, of the State of Israel as a Jewish state.  Obviously a great 
deal of this entanglement is owed to the inherent entanglement of religion and 
nation within Judaism itself. 29  But still, it is Israel’s definition as a Jewish state, 
and not its definition as a democratic state, that has justified the religious 
accommodations granted to Jewish religious institutions and Jewish religious 
norms.  Consequently, after the establishment of the state of Israel as a Jewish state 
it can no longer be said that the Jewish community in Israel is just another millet.30 
Rather, the matter of Jewish religious accommodations has essentially been 
“nationalized” thus becoming part of Israel’s “public” sphere.31 
¶11 This schism in the nature of the religious accommodations relevant to each of 
the two communities is what this author has chosen to call the “paradigm of 
separateness” in religion and state relations in Israel.  And this schism also explains 
why in fact the religion and state debate in Israel has excluded the Palestinian-Arab 
community.  For if the debate on religion and state focuses on the public nature of 
religious accommodations, it was only natural that in the Israeli context the debate 
will focus on what dominated Israel’s public sphere: the religious accommodations 
granted to the Jewish community.  Issues of religion and state of the Palestinian-
Arab minority, characterized as a group accommodation of an autonomous nature 
of the different non-Jewish religious communities, were taken to be of a “private” 
                                                 
 28 See Benjamin Braude, Foundation Myths of the Millet System, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 69 (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982); WALTER F. WEIKER, OTTOMAN 
TURKS AND THE JEWISH POLITY: A HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF TURKEY (1992); CHARLES A. FRAZEE, 
CATHOLICS AND THE SULTANS: THE CHURCH AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1983). 
 29 See Maoz, State and Religion, supra  note 24, at 243 (“Divest Jewish culture and heritage from 
religious elements and one is left rather empty handed.”). Therefore, scholars in Israel who seek to 
legitimize the Jewish character of the State of Israel go out of their way to stress how wrong it is to impose 
Jewish religious norms on members that do not opt for a religious lifestyle. See ALEXANDER YAKOBSON & 
AMNON RUBINSTEIN, YISRAEL U-MISHPAHAT HA-AMIM: MEDINAT LE’OM YEHUDIT U-ZEKHUYOT HA-
ADAM [ISRAEL AND THE FAMILY OF NATIONS: JEWISH NATION-STATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 150-65 (2003) 
(in Hebrew); ASA KASHER, RUAH ISH: ARBA‘AH SHE‘ARIM [SPIRIT OF A MAN: FOUR GATES] 19 (2000) (in 
Hebrew). 
 30 Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra  note 2, at 408 (noting that while under the Ottoman rule and the 
British mandate the religious accommodations granted to the Jewish community were motivated by the 
value of autonomy and the interest of not intervening in the internal affairs of the Jewish community, the 
reason today is the “reverse”: the interest is that of preserving the unity of the Jewish People). 
 31 I have previously doubted the normative utility of the public/private distinction, given the fact that 
many public interests can be translated into private ones and vice versa. See Michael M. Karayanni, The 
Myth and Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors” and the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 21 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 327 (2003). Nonetheless, I do think that the distinction can still contribute to our understanding 
of certain factual and normative patterns, at least in such cases in which the pattern itself has taken the 
distinction to be a valid one. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1992). 
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nature and thus beyond the parameters of Israel’s religion and state debate.  The 
discussion in the following sections essentially describes in greater detail how this 
paradigm of separateness was constitutionally, politically and socially erected. 
III. THE PARADIGM OF SEPARATENESS 
A. The Constitutional Configuration of the Religion and State Conflict in 
Israel 
¶12 The constitutional definition of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” has 
been at the forefront of legal debates for over a decade now. 32  Passionate 
arguments have been put forward claiming that the two concepts are compatible,33 
and are in fact only one variation of the nation-state structure existing in many 
other countries.34  Yet others have claimed that the two terms are inherently at 
odds.35  A state that defines itself as a Jewish state will necessarily undermine the 
rights of non-Jews and even Jews themselves if the Jewish nature of the state 
embodies principles that stand against their own personal ideals.  Yet a third camp 
has claimed that while there is an apparent tension between the two concepts, they 
could be made consonant through interpretation.  As the argument goes, this is 
possible due in a large part to the elastic nature of Jewish and democratic norms, 
for if both are brought to their minimal core values, a Jewish state can still be 
considered to be democratic.36 
¶13 The enactment in 1992 of two major Basic Laws, Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation37 and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 38 a step considered as 
constituting a form of a constitutional revolution, 39 accelerated this debate.   While 
                                                 
 32 See, e.g., RAV-TARBUTIYUT BI -MEDINAH DEMOKRATIT VI-YEHUDIT : SEFER HA-ZIKARON LE-ARIEL 
ROSEN-ZVI ZA”L [MULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH STATE: THE ARIEL ROSEN-ZVI 
MEMORIAL BOOK] (Menachem Mautner et al. eds., 1998) (in Hebrew); ADAM D. DANÉL, MEDINAH 
YEHUDIT VE-DEMOKRATIT : MABAT RAV-TARBUTI [A JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC STATE: A 
MULTICULTURALIST VIEW] (2003) (in Hebrew).  
 33 Menachem Elon, The Values of a Jewish and Democratic State: The Task of Reaching a Synthesis, in 
ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS 177 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 1998); Maoz, Religious Human Rights, 
supra  note 24, at 358 (“[t]he Jewishness of the State of Israel does not contradict its democratic nature”). 
See also  HCJ 6698/95, Qa’adan v. Minhal Mikarke’ei Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 258, 282 (stressing, per 
President Barak, that there is no contradiction between Israel’s values as a Jewish and democratic state and 
complete equality between its citizens). 
 34 The forme r president of the Supreme Court of Israel, Meir Shamgar, once observed:   “The existence 
of the State of Israel, as the state of the Jewish people does not negate its democratic character, just as the 
Frenchness of France does not negate its democratic character.” Election Appeal 1/88 Neiman v. Chairman 
of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177, 189. 
 35 See Nadim Rouhana, The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence 
to Challenge, 18 J. PALESTINIAN STUD. 38, 40-41 (1989) (“a state that is defined as belonging to only one 
people, when its population is composed of two, cannot offer equal opportunity to all its citizens”). 
 36 See RUTH GAVISON, YISRAEL KI-MEDINAH YEHUDIT VE-DEMOKRATIT : METAKHIM VE-SIKUYIM [CAN 
ISRAEL BE BOTH JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC: TENSIONS AND PROSPECTS] (1999) (in Hebrew).  
 37 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, S.H. 1454.  For an English translation see Basic Law: Freedom 
of Occupation (1994), http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic4_eng.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 
2006). 
 38 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, S.H. 1391.  For an English translation see Basic Law, Human 
Dignity and Liberty, http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006). 
 39 See Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in 
American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309 (1995); Ran Hirschl, Israel’s “Consitutional 
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these laws were not the first basic laws enacted by the Knesset,40 they were unique 
as they related specifically to certain basic human rights such as human dignity, 
liberty, mobility, privacy, and property. 41  Furthermore, these basic laws have also 
elevated the status of the norms they protect to a higher level in the general 
hierarchy of laws by providing the courts with some level of judicial review. 42  
However, relevant to our discussion is the fact that in both of these laws, the values 
of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state were also explicitly stated as 
a purpose that these laws seek to promote. 
¶14 Nevertheless, one should not be misled to think that the existing tension 
between the Jewish nature of the State of Israel and democratic norms has surfaced 
only recently.  Ever since the state’s inception, the comprehensive structure of the 
Israeli legal system has evolved and continues to evolve around these two ideals: 
the existence of a Jewish state that provides more than lip service to Jewish 
religious norms and Zionist teachings, and a state that also respects democratic 
principles and freedoms for all citizens of Israel, Jewish and non-Jewish alike.43  
Such a normative agenda was already evident in Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence which simultaneously recognized Israel as a Jewish state that would 
open its door to every Jew, granting the Jewish people the status of a nation with 
equal rights among the family of nations, and yet promised to develop the country 
for the benefit of all its inhabitants, maintaining complete equality of political and 
social rights for all citizens, irrespective of race, religion, or gender.44 
¶15 The ensuing formative decades of Israel were characterized by the 
development of legal landmarks that worked to give substance to the Jewish nature 
of the state, as well as to guarantee certain democratic freedoms.  These two 
competing norms were evident when the Knesset enacted laws considered by many 
to represent the central ethos of the Jewish state; the Law of Return, 1950,45 in 
which every Jew in the world was granted the right to immigrate to Israel and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Revolution”: The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic 
Order, 46 AM. J. COMP . L. 427 (1998). Cf. David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A 
Mini-Revolution in Israeli Constitutional Law?, 26 ISR. L. REV. 238 (1992). 
 40 In addition the following basic laws exist: Basic Law (The Knesset), 12 LSI 85 (1957-58) (Isr.); Basic 
Law: Israel Lands, 14 LSI 48 (1960) (Isr.); Basic Law: The President of the State, 18 LSI 111 (1963-64) 
(Isr.); Basic Law: The Government, 22 LSI 257 (1967-68) (Isr.)(replaced in 1992); Basic Law: The State 
Economy, 29 LSI 273 (1974-75) (Isr.); Basic Law: The Army,  30 LSI 150 (1975-76) (Isr.); Basic Law: 
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel,  34 LSI 209 (1979-80) (Isr.); Basic Law: Judicature, 38 LSI 101 (1983-84) 
(Isr.); Basic Law: The State Comptroller, 42 LSI 24 (1987-88) (Isr.). For background information about the 
whole enterprise of basic law enactment in Israel, see Asher Maoz, The Institutional Organization of the 
Israeli Legal System, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 11, 12-13 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. 
DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995).  
 41 See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic 
Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law, 31 ISR. L. REV. 3 (1997). 
 42 See Gary J. Jacobsohn, After the Revolution, 34 ISR. L. REV. 139 (2000). On the nature of judicial 
review in Israeli constitutional law after the enactment of the two mentioned basic laws see Menachem 
Hofnung, The Unintended Consequence of Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in 
Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP . L. 585 (1996). 
 43 See Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, supra  note 5, at 39; Dan Avnon, The Israeli Basic Laws’ 
(Potentially) Fatal Flaw , 32 ISR. L. REV. 535 (1998). 
 44 See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 LSI 3 (1948) (Isr.). 
 45 Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1949-50) (Isr.). 
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thereupon, through the working of the Nationality Law, 1952,46 become an Israeli 
citizen. 47  At the same time, the judiciary worked relentlessly to carve out, almost 
from scratch, such basic rights as the freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and more.48  Similarly, while the Knesset worked to enact a general law 
guaranteeing equal treatment of all women in Israel, 49 the legal system, guided by 
the Israeli Supreme Court, realized the necessity to create, also from scratch, a legal 
doctrine that restricts the participation of a list of candidates for the parliamentary 
elections that adopt a political agenda purporting to negate the Jewish nature of the 
State of Israel, which the court  regarded as a basic constitutional fact.50 
¶16 The debate over the Jewish and democratic nature of the State of Israel will 
certainly continue well into the future.  However, it is also equally true, that past 
debates and arguments have already established a number of constitutional 
paradigms.  One very important paradigm concerns the public sphere in the State of 
Israel that is principally committed to Jewish collective ideals.51  Thus it was 
natural that the flag, national emblem, anthem and official holidays of the state 
would be identified, as a matter of course, with the Jewish tradition. 52  Jewish 
Zionist organizations, such as the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish 
Agency, received official status53 and under the auspices of the law they are “to 
continue acting within the State of Israel for developing and settling the land, 
absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora and coordination in Israel of Jewish 
institutions and organizations active in the field.”54  But the Jewish domination of 
                                                 
 46 Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951-52) (Isr.). 
 47 See Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra  note 2, at 413 (characterizing the Law of Return as the 
raison d être of Israel as a Jewish State). See also  HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM THE 
RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR TIME 395 (1996) (noting that the very raison d’être of Israeli statehood was to 
provide "a homeland for all who wished to forsake the Diaspora and come home”). 
 48 See Allen Zysblat, Protecting Fundamental Rights, in Israel without a Written Constitution, in PUBLIC 
LAW IN ISRAEL 47 (Izhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996); Asher Maoz, Defending Civil Liberties 
without a Constitution – The Israeli Experience, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 815 (1988); Amos Shapira, The 
Status of Fundamental Individual Rights in the Absence of a Written Constitution, 9 ISR. L. REV. 497 
(1974). 
 49 Women’s Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 171 (1950-51) (Isr.). 
 50 Election Appeal 1/65 Yardor v. Central Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset [1965] IsrSC 19(3) 
365 (per President Simon Agranat). The power to disqualify a list of candidates who wish to run for 
elections to the Knesset received statutory recognition in 1984, when the Basic Law: The Knesset was 
amended to include the following provision (section 7A): “A list of candidates shall not participate in the 
elections for the Knesset if its aims or actions, expressly or by implication, point to one of the following: 
(1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people; (2) negation of the 
democratic nature of the State; (3) incitement to racism.” Based on subsections (2) and (3), the Supreme 
Court in Israel upheld the disqualifications of Me’ir Kahane’s Kach party in 1988 who called for a variety 
of racist restrictions to be imposed on the Palestinian-Arab community in Israel. See Election Appeal 1/88 
Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177.   
 51 See Mark A. Tessler, The Middle East: The Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and the Arabs in Israel, in 
PROTECTION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES 245, 247 (Robert G. Wirsing ed., 1981) (noting the official 
commitment of the State of Israel to its Jewish identity and how the State of Israel “is officially committed 
to perpetuating and enriching the Jewish heritage and to meeting the needs of Jews throughout the world”). 
 52 For a survey of state-enacted laws that deal with state symbols see KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS, supra  
note 27, at 17-22; see also  BARZILAI, supra  note 10, at 110 (“State law officially recognizes no Arab-
Palestinian festival.”). 
 53 World Zionist Organization – Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 5713-1952, 7 LSI 3 (1952-53) (Isr.). 
 54 It is als o worth mentioning that the specific role and function of WZO and the Jewish Agency were 
defined in covenants signed between them and the Government of Israel. Such covenants enabled WZO 
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the public sphere goes beyond such symbols.55  The concept of citizenship, for 
example, has also been influenced by the Jewish nature of Israel. 56  There are two 
types of citizenship: the first type is republican in nature and has strong collective 
goals of a shared moral purpose, a perception of the common good and core civic 
values.57  The second type, individual in nature—relevant to the non-Jewish 
population—builds on liberal ideals of personal (not collective) rights.  Another 
example concerns the official state language.  Though under the black letter of the 
law, Arabic and Hebrew are both considered official languages, it is Hebrew that 
dominates the public sphere.58  Indeed, on some occasions courts have even 
compelled public bodies to add Arabic inscription to signs and documents.59  This 
is to be done, as the Israeli Supreme Court made clear, only as long as it does not 
undermine the hierarchal relationship existing between the two languages under 
which Hebrew is regarded as “senior sister.”60  Thus it has been stated that the 
Palestinian-Arab community in Israel is “the most remote, excluded community 
from the state’s metanaratives,”61 and enjoys the status of “second”62 or even 
“third”63 class citizenship.  In many respects this hierarchical structure has 
determined the boundaries of the public sphere in Israel, 64 thereby also making it 
possible to characterize the Palestinian-Arab community in Israel as “the invisible 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the Jewish Agency to perform semi-governmental activities, which, in light of their statutory mandate, 
were restricted to the Jewish community, whether in Israel or in the Diaspora. Foremost among these 
functions is the responsibility for agricultural settlement.  As a result, “while many new agricultural 
settlements have been created for the Jews, none have been established for Arabs.” Kretzmer, 
Constitutional Law, supra  note 5, at 50. 
 55 Henry Rosenfeld, The Class Situation of the Arab National Minority in Israel, 20 COMP . STUD. SOC’Y 
& HIST . 374, 400 (1978) (stating that the State of Israel “fosters a Jewish state-nation ethos and economy 
and therein sees the Arab strictly as a minority, or a series of minority groupings, and regards development 
as relating specifically to Jews”); Mark A. Tessler, The Identity of Religious Minorities in Non-Secular 
States: Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel, 20 COMP . STUD. SOC’Y & HIST . 359, 360 (1978) 
(noting how Israel is firmly committed to a Jewish identity in different spheres that go beyond national 
symbols). 
 56 See Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy, 21 ETHNIC 
AND RACIAL STUD. 408 (1998); Shachar, Whose Republic?, supra note 17, at  260-62. 
 57 See Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the 
Jewish State, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432 (1992); see also  Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Cultural Pluralism and 
the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology, 27 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 461, 462 (1995). 
 58 See Ilan Saban & Muhammad Amara, The Status of Arabic in Israel: Reflections on the Power of Law 
to Produce Social Changes, 36 ISR. L. REV. 5 (2002). 
 59 See Ayelet Harel-Shalev, Arabic as a Minority Language in Israel: A Comparative Perspective, 14 
ADALAH’S NEWSLETTER 1, 5-6 (2005); BARZILAI, supra  note 10, at 111-13. 
 60 See HCJ 4112/99, Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Municipality 
of Tel-Aviv Jaffa [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 393, 418 (per President Aharon Barak). 
 61 BARZILAI, supra note 10 at 7. See also  As’ad Ghanem, State and Minority in Israel: The Case of 
Ethnic State and the Predicament of its Minority, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 428, 432-34 (1998) (stating 
that as a result of Israel’s structural identification with its Jewish ethnic ideals the Palestinian-Arab 
minority was collectively excluded from the official public domain of the state). 
 62 Ahmad H. Sa’di, Israel as Ethnic Democracy: What are the Implications for the Palestinian Minority, 
22 ARAB STUD. Q. 25, 25 (2000). 
 63 SHAFIR & PELED, supra  note 21, at 110. 
 64 Baruch Kimmerling, Sociology, Ideology, and Nation-Building: The Palestinians and Their Meaning 
in Israeli Sociology , 57 AM. SOC. REV. 446, 450 (1992) (“[A]rabs in Israel] remained … outside of the 
collectivity’s boundaries as nonmembers of ‘Israel.’”); MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 41 (1997) 
(noting how the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel, though citizens of the state, nevertheless “do not find 
their history or culture mirrored in its public life”). 
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man,”65 or as the “odd man out.”66  By virtue of the same process, the Jewish nature 
of the State of Israel, this time in its religious form, also came to dominate Israel's 
public sphere.67  Accordingly, the entity of the State of Israel itself has become both 
the domain as well as the instrument for handling the Jewish community’s religion 
and state relations.68  Moreover, the whole state political apparatus has been 
recruited to help ease religious and state tensions among the different factions of 
the Jewish community, namely the secular and the religious orthodox camps.69  
Since religion and state matters concerning the Palestinian-Arab minority were by 
definition excluded from such a constitutional configuration, such matters simply 
continued to be regarded as they were before the establishment of the State of Israel 
– a group accommodation of a religious community that the state seeks to tolerate 
as a group.  Such accommodations were to stay a “private” matter, or to use one of 
Virginia Woolf's famous titles – “a room of one’s own” instead of that of the 
state.70 
¶17 Another important ingredient of this group accommodation perception is that 
the religious accommodations of the different Palestinian-Arab religious 
communities were conceived as a group accommodation of the Palestinian-Arab 
minority in Israel as a national group, instead of just a group accommodation of a 
particular Palestinian-Arab religious community.71  Thus it became relatively 
                                                 
 65 Sammy Smooha & Don Peretz, The Arabs in Israel, 26 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 451 (1982) (adding that 
this characterization is also true with respect to the surrounding Arab countries that have also absented the 
Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel from the overall Israeli-Arab conflict). 
 66 Joel S. Migdal & Baruch Kimmerling, The Odd Man Out: Arabs in Israel, in THROUGH THE LENS OF 
ISRAEL: EXPLORATIONS IN STATE AND SOCIETY 173 (Joel S. Migdal ed., 2001). 
 67 See CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL: TRADITIONAL 
JUDAISM AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE JEWISH STATE 12, 161-62 (1983)  (stating that the conception of 
civil religion in Israel that came to dominate the public sphere builds on the Jewish identity of the state of 
Israel and thus excluded from it the Arab population in Israel). 
 68 Izhak Englard, The Conflict Between State and Religion in Israel: Its Ideological Background, in 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE 219 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993) (explaining how 
the tendency to integrate Jewish religious institutions into the framework of the State of Israel did not meet 
any substantial opposition, though motives of the secular and Orthodox camps varied). 
Interestingly, in a relatively recent article it was stated that in the first two decades after the 
establishment of the State of Israel, the Jewish religious camp was not successful in transforming the public 
domain of Israel into a Jewish religious one. See Aviad Hacohen, “Medinat Yisrael, Kan Makom 
Kadosh!”: Itsuv “Reshut Rabim Yehudit” bi-Medinat Yisrael ["The State of Israel – This is a Holy Place!”: 
Forming a ”Jewish Public Domain” in the State of Israel] , in SHNEY IVREY HA-GESHER: DAT U-MEDINA 
BE-REISHIT DARKA SHEL YISRAEL [ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BRIDGE, RELIGION AND STATE IN THE EARLY 
YEARS OF ISRAEL] 144 (Mordechai Bar-On & Zvi Zameret eds., 2002) (in Hebrew).   
Even if I were to set aside the problematic classification that Dr. Hacohen makes in his article in 
terms of differentiating between the “public” and the “private” domain (classifying, for example, issues 
pertaining to the law of marriage and divorce and the determination of the status of a “Jew” as matters of 
the private domain, id. at 145), his analysis seems to be totally irrelevant to the context of this study.  
Nowhere in his article, does Hacohen compare the recognition that was nevertheless accorded to Jewish 
religious institutions with the recognition accorded to the non-Jewish religious communities. Rather, his 
analysis, like the vast majority of the scholarly work that dealt with religion and state in Israel, was 
restricted to the intra-Jewish context.   
 69 CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL (1984); A SHER 
COHEN & BERNARD SUSSER, MI-HASHLAMAH LE-HASLAMAH: HA-SHESA HA-DATI-HILONI BE-FETAH HA-
ME’AH HA-ESRIM VE-AHAT [FROM ACCOMMODATION TO ESCALATION, THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DIVIDE 
AT THE OUTSET OF THE 21ST CENTURY] (2003) (in Hebrew).  
 70 VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN (1929). 
 71 See supra  note 27. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 6  
 
52 
common in the literature dealing with Israel's attitude toward the Palestinian-Arab 
community to portray religious accommodations as a sort of “autonomy,”72 a 
“multicultural entitlement,”73 and as a sign of “pluralism.”74  Returning to Israel's 
definition as a "Jewish and democratic state", it is Israel's democratic and liberal 
principles that serve as a constitutional anchorage for the grant of religious 
accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab minority. 75 
¶18 This narrative about religious accommodations being a form of liberal and 
multicultural accommodation is totally absent from the discussion on the nature of 
religious jurisdiction of Jewish institutions.  In fact, this latter discussion 
particularly stressed the coercive and illiberal nature of the jurisdiction of certain 
Jewish religious institutions especially in matters of marriage and divorce,76 and 
that such a jurisdiction continued to exist as a matter of necessity, 77 compromise 
and the need to preserve unity. 78  Moreover, because there seems to be a secular 
majority within the Jewish community that would prefer to be free from certain 
                                                 
 72  See Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion , supra  note 19, at 40 (characterizing the judicial jurisdiction 
of the non-Jewish religious communities to administer their religious law in matters of personal status as a 
form of “communal autonomy of minority groups”); LANDAU, THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL, supra  note 
14, at 24 (noting that the autonomous administration historically enjoyed by the different religious 
communities continued to persist in the State of Israel); ORI STENDEL, THE MINORITIES IN ISRAEL: TRENDS 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB AND DRUZE COMMUNITIES 1948-1973 8 (1973) (stating that all of the 
Palestinian-Arab religious communities “maintain a considerable measure of internal autonomy”); ERVIN 
BIRNBAUM, THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE: STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL 113 (1970) (noting how the 
Ministry for Religious Affairs in Israel has “carefully safeguarded” the “autonomy” of the non-Jewish 
religious minorities). 
 73 In fact authorities refer to all accommodations of the religious communities, Jewish and non-Jewish 
alike, in terms of a group accommodation which is a form of a mult icultural accommodation. See AYELET 
SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 8 (2001) 
(indicating that Israel together with India and Kenya have adopted expansive accommodation policies in 
various social arenas); Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces 
of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 387 (2000) (stating that the concept of 
differentiated citizenship, a synonymous concept of multicultural citizenship, is currently adopted in a 
variety of different forms in Israel as well as in Canada, England, the United States, India and Kenya); 
Shachar, Whose Republic?, supra  note 17, at 263 (indicating that “[t]he communal autonomy granted to the 
various recognized re ligious communities in Israel is important in terms of permitting different citizens to 
preserve their cultural and religious group identity”); Galanter & Krishnan, supra  note 1, at 105 (indicating 
that personal laws, including those of religious segments are designed to preserve each community’s laws). 
 74 See Ruth Lapidoth, Religious Pluralism in Israel, 37 STUDI PARMENSI 45, 57 (1988). 
 75 Rubinstein, Law and Religion in Israel, supra  note 2, at 390 (characterizing the government’s attitude 
towards the Christian communities in Israel as “liberal” given the fact that such communities are in some 
cases even directed and controlled from Arab countries). 
 76 In his recently published autobiography, Haim Cohn, a pre-eminent Israeli jurist, Supreme Court 
justice and a champion of human rights, has called the rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate matters 
of personal status (but interestingly just the rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction) as “a blot on Israel’s 
democracy.” HAIM HERMANN COHN, MAVO ISHI: OTOBIYOGRAFIYAH [A PERSONAL INTRODUCTION 
:AUTOBIOGRAPHY] 242 (2005) (in Hebrew). 
 77 See Stephen Goldstein, Israel: A Secular or a Religious State, 36 ST . LOUIS U. L.J. 143, 149 (1992) 
(“Secular Zionists have sought to unify the Jewish population in Israel by constructing public life in a 
manner that ensures full participation by religious Jews.”); see also  EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 51 (in the 
context of the jurisdiction ascribed to the rabbinical courts in Israel and the religious accommodation in 
accordance with the status quo agreement, identifying the “extremely high value placed on the need for 
unity”, especially in light of the fact that “the external threat to Israel has not disappeared”); Englard, supra  
note 5, at 193 (noting that political compromises between Jewish secular and religious parties were 
facilitated inter alia, by “the common striving for national unity”). 
 78 COHEN & SUSSER, supra  note 69; Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for 
Reevaluation and Constitutional Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP . L. REV. 617 (1999). 
Vol. 5:1] Michael M. Karayanni 
53 
religious norms,79 it has been observed that this state of being, “turns the 
conventional multicultural dilemma on its face, from a question of awarding 
respect and rights to patriarchal minority culture at the expense of its own 
members, into a question of imposition of the patriarchal minority culture over the 
liberal majority, at the expense of the members of the majority.”80 
¶19 This fundamental difference in the nature of the religious accommodations 
granted to the Jewish community as opposed to those granted to the Palestinian-
Arab communities was particularly highlighted by Israel's official justification for 
the continuation of the Ottoman millet system.  Israel’s arguments for preserving 
this system have varied depending on the community.  The argument associated 
with the Jewish community  (cumulatively or alternatively) stresses the political 
necessities derived from the status quo document, the need for the major parties to 
unite with the Jewish religious parties in order to form government coalitions, and 
the need to preserve Jewish unity and Jewish heritage.81  Israel’s argument with 
respect to the Palestinian-Arab community has been based on the desire not to 
interfere in this community’s internal religious affairs,82 especially in light of the 
fact that the “interfering” establishment was identified with a group that differs 
religiously and faces national tensions with the nation of the Palestinian-Arab 
minority. 
¶20 Consider in this respect the observations of two Israeli scholars in the field of 
religion and state.  Professor Frances Raday has attempted to show how the 
incorporation of the Ottoman millets in the Israeli legal system, especially in terms 
of granting various religious courts the judicial capacity to apply their religious 
norms, made it possible to preserve the existence of what she called “a patriarchal 
legal system.”  In explaining why Israel inherited the millets from the British 
Mandate Professor Raday states the following: 
There was a national consensus that there was a need to salvage the 
remnants of a Jewish people and culture after these had been on the verge 
of annihilation in the holocaust.  In addition, this was the price exacted by 
                                                 
 79 Margit Cohn, Women, Religious Law and Religious Courts in Israel, 27 RETFAERD: SCANDINAVIAN J. 
SOC. SCI. 57, 58 (2004) (characterizing the problem of institutionalizing religion of the Jewish community 
as an infringement on the rights of a liberal majority instead of the right of a religious majority to express 
their beliefs); EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 60-61 (noting the troublesome fact that rabbinical courts in Israel 
decide matters of personal status on the basis of halachic norms to which the majority of the Jewish 
community does not subscribe).  The division of the Jewish community between a secular majority and a 
religious minority seems to have been made on the basis of surveys inquiring as to whether the Jewis h 
public accepts the compulsory nature of Jewish religious norms, such as having only orthodox religious 
marriage, the closing of shops and restaurants on the Sabbath, restricting public transportation on the 
Sabbath and the funding of Jewish religious institutions. When asked about these issues, a considerable 
portion within the Jewish community seems to be against such religious accommodations. See LEVY ET AL., 
supra  note 9, at 8. 
 80 Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA  J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 339, 343 (2000).  
 81 See, e.g., Rubinstein, State and Religion , supra  note 3, at 115, 121; Maoz, Religious Human Rights, 
supra  note 2, at 363; Bassli, supra  note 24, at 488-90. 
 82 See STENDEL, supra  note 72, at 8 (Former Deputy Advisor in the Office of the Advisor to the Prime 
Minister on Arab Affairs, the principal governmental office that articulated the official policy towards the 
Palestinian-Arab community in Israel, stating that “[f]rom the establishment of the State, the government 
policy has been not to interfere in the religious affairs of the various communities.”). 
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the religious political parties for giving coalition support to the party in 
power.  Furthermore, there was a reluctance to intervene in the internal 
social organization of minority communities.83 
¶21 Note the schism in the proposed arguments that explain the manner in which 
the millet system has become part of the Israeli legal system—one set of arguments 
is relevant for the Jewish community and the other set is relevant for the “minority 
communities.”     
¶22 Another statement embodying a contrast between the religious 
accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel and those 
granted to the Jewish community is that of Izhak Englard, a former Supreme Court 
Justice and Professor of Law who stated: 
The problem faced by the substantial non-Jewish minority—mainly 
Moslem and Christian Arabs—differs fundamentally from that of the 
Jewish inhabitants.  Their position is inevitably influenced by the broader 
and age-old Israeli Arab conflict over Palestine.  For them the issue is not 
merely the place of religion in the modern state, but that the very existence 
of the Jewish state has created a deeply felt national, and, for some, 
religious dilemma … this politically delicate background has caused a 
shifting of concern from individual freedom of religion to collective 
autonomy.  This tendency is probably one of the main reasons why the 
traditional system of legally recognized religious communities exercising 
jurisdiction over their members has been rigorously maintained in 
contemporary Israel in relation to non-Jewish minorities.  In fact, any 
proposal to change the status quo in this field runs the risk of being 
interpreted as an attempt to reduce the national cultural identity of the 
Arab population.  The whole problem of law and religion in relation to the 
non-Jewish minority has, therefore, to be understood in the light of that 
particular sensitivity and concern for collective Arab identity. 84 
¶23 Israel's constitutional definition as a Jewish state that is also committed to 
democratic ideals has determined the nature and justifications for the religious 
accommodations of both the Jewish majority and the Palestinian-Arab minority.  
The Jewishness of the state is considered to be the constitutional basis for 
recognizing Jewish religious institutions and Jewish religious norms.  However, it 
is Israel’s democratic principles that led to the recognition of religious 
accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab religious communities. 
                                                 
 83 Frances Raday, Israel – The Incorporation of Religious Patriarchy in a Modern State, 4 INT’L REV. 
COMP . PUB. POL’Y 209, 210 (1992). 
 84 Englard, supra  note 5, at 189-90. 
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B. Substantiating Evidence of the Public/Private Nature of Religious 
Accommodations in Regulation and Methodology 
¶24 Two revealing pieces of evidence substantiate the assessment made here 
about how religious accommodations of the Jewish community came to dominate 
Israel's public sphere and by the same process, the religious accommodations of the 
Palestinian-Arab minority were relegated to the private sphere of minority-group-
accommodations.  The first concerns the public accommodation and state funding 
of Jewish religious institutions and the second concerns the pervasive methodology 
of texts dealing with religion and state in Israel that clearly shows its Jewish 
centrality. 
1. The Issue of Public Recognition and Public Funding 
¶25 The Jewish community is far more privileged in the public accommodation 
and state funding of its religious institutions.85  The Chief Rabbinate of Israel is an 
institution that is statutorily recognized, regulated,86 and also fully supported by 
public funds.87  Specific legislation regulates Jewish religious services,88 Jewish 
religious councils,89 and Jewish religious sites.90  Also in the foreign diplomacy 
arena, the Chief Rabbis of Israel receive protocol priority over the heads of other 
religious communities in Israel.91  The Israeli Ministry of Education operates a 
religious school system alongside the regular Jewish school system. 92  There is no 
equivalent legislative recognition of non-Jewish religious institutions.93 
                                                 
 85 See Francis Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality: The Israeli Case, 25 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
193, 213 (1995) (“Israel was established as a ‘Jewish State’ and this results in a preferred status for 
Judaism….”) [hereinafter Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality]. Even official reports submitted 
by the Israeli Government have admitted the great gap between state funding of Jewish and non-Jewish 
religious institutions. See ISRAELI ICCPR REPORT , supra  note 4, at 228 (“In comparison with funding of 
Jewish religious institutions, the non-Jewish communities are rather severely undersupported by the 
Government.”). 
 86 Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 97 (1979-80) (Isr.). 
 87See Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion, supra note 19, at 39 (“State law regulates the appointment of 
central and local rabbinic bodies, administrative as well as judicial, with all such bodies being financed by 
state funds.”). 
 88 Jewish Religious Services (Consolidated Version) Law, 5731-1971, 25 LSI 125 (1970-71) (Isr.); 
Kasher Food for Soldiers Ordinance, 5709-1948, 2 LSI 37 (1948-49) (Isr.); Prevention of Fraud in Torah 
Books, Prayer Scrolls, Phylacteries and Mezuzot Law, 1974, S.H. 749; Prohibition of Fraud in Kashrut 
Law, 1983, S.H. 1088; Prohibition of Opening Places of Entertainment on Tisha’a bi-Av (Special 
Authorization) Law, 1997, S.H. 1637; Residence of Rabbis in their Place of Service Law, 2002, S.H. 1877; 
The Counsel for the Perpetuation of the Heritage of Sephardic and Oriental Jewry Law, 2002, S.H. 1876.  
 89  See EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 52 (describing how religious councils work to minister to the 
religious needs of the Jewish community in such matters as, maintenance of synagogues, cemeteries, ritual 
baths, supervision of kashru t, and the appointment of marriage registrars). 
 90 See BARZILAI, supra  note 10, at 109 (“Formally, state law protects all religious sites in Israel without 
distinction [referring to Protection of Holy Sites Law, 1967]. Yet in a regulation issued by the minister of 
religions, only Jewish religious places were mentioned as protected sites [referring to Protection of Holy 
Sites Regulations, 1981].”). 
 91 Rubinstein, State and Religion , supra  note 3, at 117. 
 92 See Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion, supra note 19. 
 93 Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra  note 2, at 400. 
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¶26 Additionally, outright disparity exists at times between the budgets available 
to Jewish religious institutions as opposed to non-Jewish ones.94  This is true even 
though some authorities might imply that support is divided equitably.95  For 
example, it was noted by one scholar that in 1981 the salary of a Rabbinical Court 
judge (dayyan) was raised to the equivalent of “a magistrate in the civil court 
system, but the salary of a Muslim qadi remained that of a Justice of the Peace.”96  
Only in the mid-1990s did such patterns of disparity manage to receive some legal 
attention from the courts.  A civil rights organization, Adalah, The Legal Center for 
the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel, proved to the Supreme Court that despite 
the fact that the Palestinian-Arab minority composes approximately 20 percent of 
the total population of Israel, its portion of the Ministry for Religious Affairs 
budget amounted to only 2 percent.97  However, even with this proof, the Cour t was 
still unprepared to intervene until the petitioner offered further evidence showing 
that specific religious services of each of the religious communities are treated 
unequally by the Ministry for Religious Affairs.98  This evidence was found in the 
Ministry for Religious Affairs’ 1999 fiscal year budgetary allotment to cemeteries 
operated by different religious communities.99  While a sum of NIS 16.658 million 
(equivalent to approximately US $3.7 million) was principally allocated to 
cemeteries in the Jewish communities, only NIS 202,000 (equivalent to 
approximately US $44,888) of the standing budget for cemeteries was allotted to 
the non-Jewish population.  In light of these findings, the Supreme Court instructed 
the Ministry for Religious Affairs to divide its budget in accordance with the 
principal of equal treatment between the cemeteries of the different religious 
communities.100  As noted by Professor Asher Maoz, the reality in which Jewish 
                                                 
 94 Saban, supra  note 27, at 943 (“Throughout Israel's history, there has been major, ongoing 
discrimination in budgeting for religious services for the Muslim and Christian communities in comparis on 
to that for the Orthodox Jewish community.”). 
 95 Ori Stendel, The Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 134, 152 (1971) (noting 
how in the area of religious services Israeli government authorities have carried out improvements “on an 
ongoing basis” with respect to Moslem religious institutions, whether constructing new mosques, 
maintaining cemeteries and holy places and establishing local committees to handle community property); 
Rubinstein, Law and Religion , supra  note 2, at 388 (noting that though the affairs of the non-Jewish 
religious communities in Israel are not all regulated by law, they still “enjoy Government support in 
maintaining religious services”).    
 96 EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 78. However, this practice seems to have stopped after 1981. A table of 
the current salaries of judges of all courts, including those of the rabbinical and Shari’a  courts, can be 
found at http://www.hilan.co.il/moked_yeda_lesachar/laws/mskchk66t.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). 
 97 HCJ 240/98 Adalah  The Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister 
for Religious Affairs, [1999] IsrSC 52(5)167, 178. 
 98 Id. at 171. 
 99 HCJ 1113/99 Adalah The Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of 
Religious Affairs, [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164 [hereinafter HCJ 1113/99 Adalah II]. 
 100 It is also worth mentioning that this is not the first instance in which the Supreme Court has 
intervened in budget allocations that were heavily biased in favor of the Jewis h community. In HCJ 
1113/99 Adalah II Justice Zamir mentions the case of  HCJ 2422/98 Adalah.  The Legal Center for the 
Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of Labor and Welfare (not published), where it was 
exposed that the Ministry of Labor and Welfare regularly gives out special allowances for the needy in the 
Jewish community on the eve of Passover. No such practice existed concerning the needy members of any 
of the Palestinian-Arab religious communities on the eve of any of their holidays. As a result of the 
petition, the Ministry of Labor and Welfare agreed to amend its practice and to distribute the mentioned 
allowances in an equitable manner. HCJ 1113/99 Adalah II, supra  note 99, at 174.     
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religious institutions enjoy substantially more state funding than other religions “is 
more than just a matter of demography, that is, the vast preponderance of 
(Orthodox) Jews in Israel.”101  It is attributed to “[n]ational, historical and political 
factors.”102  Maoz adds: 
Israel, as the homeland of the Jewish people, has assumed as one of its 
major tasks the maintenance and development of Jewish culture and 
tradition, which naturally have religious dimensions.  Moreover, following 
the Holocaust that destroyed the world center of Jewish learning, Israel 
assumed the task of replacing those centers in Israel, and rebuilding the 
institutions of learning destroyed in Europe.103 
2. The Issue of Pervasive Methodology 
¶27 It is widely admitted that the pervasive methodology of study relating to 
matters of religion and state in Israel is one in which the context of the discussion 
as well as the normative implications are primarily Jewish. 104  For example, the 
entrenchment of this phenomenon was evident when looking into a legislative 
initiative undertaken by a Member of Knesset (MK) from the National Religious 
Party, Nahum Langenthal, in 2000.  The title of the bill proposed by MK 
Langenthal was “Religion and State.”  However, the section entitled “objective” 
stated that the purpose of the draft bill was “to mold, regulate and determine rules 
and principles in the matter of compatibility and relation of the Jewish religion in 
the State of Israel.”  The provisions of the draft bill make clear that the initiative 
did not accidentally overlook the religious issues of the other religious communities 
in Israel.  For example, section 10 of the draft bill, appearing in the chapter 
discussing the Sabbath as the official day of rest, specifically refers to regions in 
Israel populated by a non-Jewish majority in which exemptions to the ordinary 
rules may apply. 
¶28 Another striking example is an article published by two researchers from the 
social sciences entitled “Interreligious Conflict in Israel: The Group Basis of 
Conflicting Visions.”105  The article focuses on the tension between the Jewish 
Orthodox establishment and the secular camp, making clear that the discussion is in 
fact intra-Jewish.  No caveat even appears in the text acknowledging that the title of 
the article may mislead readers to believe that the referenced interreligious conflict 
might be among and between the Jewish community and the other 13 recognized 
religious communities existing in Israel as well.  These examples only reflect the 
general trend in the research conducted on religion and state in Israel.  For example, 
a recent survey of research trends conducted on major subjects concerning 
                                                 
 101 Maoz, Religious Human Rights, supra  note 2, at 369. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See, e.g., Nachoum Langenthal & Shuki Friedman, Mevo [Introduction], in HA-KONFLIKT : DAT U-
MEDINA BE -YISRAEL [THE CONFLICT : RELIGION AND STATE IN ISRAEL] 9, 13-14 (Nachoum Langenthal & 
Shuki Friedman eds., 2002) (in Hebrew). 
 105 Kenneth D. Wald & Samuel Shye, Interreligious Conflict in Israel: The Group Basis of Conflicting 
Visions, 16 POL. BEHAV. 157 (1994). 
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communities and state in Israel106 was written by Professor Eliezer Don-Yehiya,107 a 
renowned Israeli academic in the field of religion and state whose previous work 
mainly concerned the political aspects of Jewish religious accommodations.108  In 
his introduction, Professor Don-Yehiya pointed to the complexity of the definition 
of religion and state in Israel, given its relation to the national identity of Israel, its 
society and the inter-communal relations existing among the different groups.  
Thus the relevant research conjures up Zionism, political culture, the relationship 
between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora and the relationship between Jews and 
Arabs.109  But as one proceeds to read the survey itself, it is striking how much the 
subject, as perceived in practice, is Jewish oriented and homogenous in terms of the 
communities surveyed.  The survey redundantly focused on issues such as: the 
status of halacha in Israel, the Jewish religious parties, the question of who is a 
“Jew,” nationalism and fundamentalism within the Jewish religious community, the 
status quo agreement, the ultra-orthodox community, the exact meaning of Israel as 
a Jewish and democratic state as the structural context for the relation between 
religion and state in Israel, and comparative studies on the standing of Judaism in 
Israel as compared with the standing of minority religions in other Western 
countries.  Consequently, it was natural for one of the commentators on Professor 
Don-Yehiya’s paper to caution against the possibility of researchers on the subject 
of religion and state in Israel not having a proper knowledge of Jewish halacha.110 
¶29 This same trend found its way into the political and legal literature as well.  
Major scholarly works on religion and state in Israel have also focused on the 
tension existing between Jewish religious norms, accommodations given to Jewish 
religious institutions, and secular-liberal ideals.111  Treaties and surveys on family 
                                                 
 106 MEDINA VE-KEHILAH [STATE AND COMMUNITY] (Moshe Naor ed., 2004) (in Hebrew). 
 107 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, State and Religion in Israel: Developments and Trends in Research, in STATE 
AND COMMUNITY, supra note 106, at 151 [hereinafter Don-Yehiya, State and Religion in Israel: 
Developments]. 
 108 See, e.g., LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL, supra note 67; LIEBMAN &  DON-
YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL, supra  note 69; Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion and Coalition: 
The National Religious Party and Coalition Formation in Israel, in THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL-1973 255 
(Asher Arian ed., 1975); Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: 
The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim, 23 MIDDLE E. STUD. 215 (1987); Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion, 
Social Cleavages and Political Behavior: The Religious Parties in the Israeli Elections, in WHO’S THE 
BOSS? THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL, 1988 AND 1989 83 (Daniel J. Elazar & Shmuel Sandler eds., 1993); 
Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion, Ethnicity and Electoral Reform: The Religious Parties and the 1996 
Elections, in ISRAEL AT THE POLLS 1996 73 (Daniel J. Elazar & Shmuel Sandler eds., 1998). 
 109 Don-Yehiya, State and Religion in Israel: Developments, supra note 107, at 151. 
 110 Asher Cohen, Discussion, in STATE AND COMMUNITY, supra note 106, at 183. 
 111 See, e.g., Natahn Rothenstreich, Secularism and Religion in Israel, 15 JUDAISM 259 (1966);  Aharon 
Lichtenstein, Religion and State: The Case forInteraction, 15 JUDAISM 387 (1966); BIRNBAUM, supra  note 
72; S. CLEMENT LESLIE, THE RIFT IN ISRAEL, RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND SECULAR DEMOCRACY (1971); 
Ephraim Tabory, Religious Rights as a Social Problem in Israel, 11 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 256 (1981); 
LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL, supra  note 67; LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION 
AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL, supra note 69; CHARLES S. LIEBMAN, RELIGION, DEMOCRACY AND ISRAELI 
SOCIETY (1997); Izhak Englard, The Relationship Between Religion and State in Israel, 16 SCRIPTA 
HIEROSOLYMITANA 254 (1966); Shimon Shetreet, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion: A 
Dialogue, 4 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 194 (1974); Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Freedom of Religion: The Israeli 
Experience, 46 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT  213 (1986); 
Norman L. Cantor, Religion and State in Israel and the United States, 8 TEL-AVIV STUD. L. 185 (1988); 
Sapir, supra  note 78; Shimon Shetreet, State and Religion: Funding of Religious Institutions – The Case of 
Israel in Comparative Perspective, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUBL. POL’Y 421 (1999); Zaharah R. 
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law—a discipline traditionally influenced by religious law—have also tended to 
restrict their discussion to the Jewish community though their titles suggest that 
they are relevant to Israel in general. 112 
¶30 All of this cannot be coincidental.  Given the Jewish nature of the state, the 
subject of religion and state conflict has been transformed and essentially restricted 
to a conflict between Jewish religious ideals and secular- liberal norms.  The shape 
and type of the public sphere that developed in Israel over the years, and is in 
essence centered around Judaism, demanded this treatment of the religion and state 
controversy.  Just as Israel’s national symbols and ethos, concepts of citizenship, 
and legislation of religious institutions is Jewish-centered, so are all other issues 
that relate to religion and state. 
¶31 However, it is not the intention of this article to suggest that minority 
religions in Israel, primarily those of the Palestinian-Arab community, are 
altogether excluded from public accommodations, whether it be in the form of 
recognition or in the form of funding.  For indeed, the Moslem, the Druze and the 
major Christian communities all enjoy official legal status that affords them the 
legal capacity to administer their own religious norms in matters under their 
jurisdiction, a jurisdictional capacity that is essentially no different from that 
accorded to the Rabbinical courts of the Jewish community.113  In fact, the Moslem 
Shari’a courts have historically enjoyed the widest jurisdictional authority in 
matters of personal status, which corresponds to the adoption of the Ottoman millet 
system by Israel. 114 
¶32 Yet the thesis of this article is not about the religious freedoms of the non-
Jewish communities in Israel to practice and apply their religious norms through 
their religious institutions. Rather, it is principally about the nature of religious 
accommodations accorded to such communities in a state that is officially defined 
as a Jewish state.  This article argues that religious accommodations for the 
Palestinian-Arab religious communities are perceived as accommodations justified 
on the basis of a minority group right, and thus are fundamentally different in 
nature from the religious “accommodations” allotted to the Jewish community.  
The latter are commonly justified in terms of the nature of the State of Israel as a 
whole. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Markoe, Note, Expressing Oneself Without a Constitution: The Israeli Story, 8 CARDOZO J. INT 'L & COMP . 
L. 319, 327-28 (2000); Ezra Kopelowitz, Religious Politics and Israel's Ethnic Democracy, 6 ISR. STUD. 
166 (2001); Shimon Shetreet, Resolving the Controversy over the Form and Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Adjudication in Israel: A Blueprint for Redefining the Role of the Supreme Court and the Knesset, 77 TUL. 
L. REV. 659 (2003). 
 112 See, e.g., BENZION SCHERESCHEWSKY, DINNEY MISHPAKHA [FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL] (4th ed. 1993) 
(in Hebrew); PINHAS SHIFMAN, MI MEFAKHED MI-NISSUIN EZRAKHI’IM? [CIVIL MARRIAGE IN ISRAEL: THE 
CASE FOR REFORM] (1995) (in Hebrew); BOAZ KRAUS, GERUSHIN: MADRIKH MA’ASI LE-GERUSHIN 
[DIVORCE, A GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW] (4th ed. 1998) (in Hebrew); MICHAEL CORINALDI  DINNEY ISHIM, 
MISHPAKHA VE-YERUSHA: BEIN DAT LE-MEDINA, MEGAMOT HADASHOT [STATUS, FAMILY AND 
SUCCESSION LAW BETWEEN STATE AND RELIGION] (2004) (in Hebrew). 
 113 Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality, supra  note 85. 
 114 See, e.g., Ori Stendel, The Arabs of Israel, Between Hammer and Anvil, 20 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 287, 
302 (1990); EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 77. 
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IV.  THE PARADIGM OF SEPARATENESS RE-ENFORCED 
¶33 In Israel, this paradigm of separateness was further entrenched in the religion 
and state conceptual framework as a result of two other forces: The first is external, 
brought to bear by state executive authorities, and the second is internal, derived 
from intra-Palestinian-Arab perceptions. 
A. External Re-Enforcements 
¶34 The implementation of state policies regarding the Palestinian-Arab minority 
has traditionally underscored the presumed security threat posed by the Palestinian-
Arab minority remaining within the 1948 borders.115  After all, this population not 
only lost its majority status in what they considered their homeland; many members 
were also displaced from their homes.116  Moreover, many of the Palestinian-Arab 
minority members were detached from close family relatives and some were even 
considered legally absent, though physically present, making it possible for the 
government to take over their possessions.117  This minority was also an ethnic and 
national continuation of a nation at war with the state in which they became 
citizens.118  Consequently, a number of measures were taken by state authorities 
with the intention of controlling the Palestinian-Arab minority, thereby mitigating 
their perceived threat to state security. 119  One such measure was the military 
government imposed on the Palestinian-Arab population for more than 18 years 
(1948-1966).120  Another method used was fragmentation—to create new and 
                                                 
 115 Kimmerling, supra  note 64, at 447 (“Arabs inside of Israel were suspected of being ‘a fifth column’ 
or a ‘Trojan Horse.’”). 
 116 See DON PERETZ, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN ARABS 91 (1958). 
 117 Over time, this odd legal status of present but legally absent personas came to be regarded as a 
metaphor for the absence of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel from many facets of Israeli society. See 
DAVID GROSSMAN, SLEEPING ON A WIRE: CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL (Haim Watzman 
trans., 1993). The Hebrew title of the book is “Nochaheem Nifkadeem,” which literally means “Present 
Absentees.” 
 118 See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL, supra  note 67, at 165 (“Israeli 
encouragement of an Arab national identity, including a measure of Arab autonomy, is fraught with the 
danger of turning the population into agents of enemy countries, of encouraging them to demand territorial 
separation from Israel and unification with a neighboring state.”); see also  Rebecca Kook, Dilemmas of 
Ethnic Minorities in Democracies: The Effect of Peace on the Palestinians in Israel, 23 POL. & SOC'Y 309, 
312 (1995). 
 119 See LUSTICK, supra note 14. 
 120 Suhaila Haddad et al., Minorities in Containment: The Arabs of Israel, in THE POLITICAL ROLE OF 
MINORITY GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  76, 84 (R.D. McLaurin ed., 1979) (“The principal tool employed 
to control the Arab sector was the military government.”).  In daily life, military government meant the 
following: 
[T]he military governor could “proclaim any area or place a forbidden area.” To enter or leave 
such an area one needed “a written permit from the military commander or his deputy…failing 
which he is considered to have committed a crime.” All the Arab villages and towns, even in the 
Negev, were declared “security zones” (forbidden areas); so Arabs required permits from the 
military government to leave and enter. Each village constituted, in effect, a separate zone, 
making travel between villages subject to permission of the military governor. Article 109 of the 
military government regulations allowed the military government to banish individuals – in 
effect to force them to live in designated areas. Other such regulations permitted imposition of 
partial or complete curfews in any area.” 
Id. at 79. 
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strengthen existing barriers—within the Palestinian-Arab minority groups, under 
the premise that a segmented society could be controlled better.121  The separate 
religious communities of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel proved to be a rich 
natural resource that facilitated this fragmentation policy. 122 
¶35 One characteristic mark of this government policy is to view the Palestinian-
Arab community as separate religious groups while combining all other efforts to 
deny the community’s collective national rights.123  Thus, while in the national front 
of state-minority, the Palestinian-Arab citizen is principally viewed in his or her 
individual capacity, in the religious sphere the Palestinian-Arab citizen is 
contemplated by his or her collective religious identity. 124 
¶36 There may have also been another purpose behind the interest of the Israeli 
establishment in maintaining the millet infrastructure among the Palestinian-Arab 
minority, something that strengthened their separate and different nature even 
further. The system also enabled the government to formalize differential treatment 
among the various Palestinian-Arab religious communities that accorded to pre-
conceived policies toward each one of them.125  Such an attitude would have been 
much harder to formalize if the religious accommodations of the different 
Palestinian-Arab religious communities would have been regarded as public in 
nature and thus susceptible to the regular body of norms governing public 
institutions, religious or otherwise. 
¶37 The Christian communities gained very little statutory recognition. 126  Such 
communities appoint their own clergyman to serve as judges in Christian 
ecclesiastical courts and they determine their internal court structure as they deem 
necessary. 127  Moreover, each of the Christian religious communities appoints local 
                                                 
 121 Id. at 80-81; LUSTICK, supra  note 14, at 133. 
 122 NAOMI SHEPHERDED: PLOUGHING SAND, BRITISH RULE IN PALESTINE 1917-1948 245 (1999) (noting 
how preserving the Ottoman millet system suited Israel’s interests, inter alia, for maintaining the status of 
the Palestinian-Arab population not as one but several minority groups); KAIS M. FIRRO, THE DRUZES IN 
THE JEWISH STATE: A BRIEF HISTORY 99-104 (1999) (depicting the formation of government policy in 
preventing the creation of a single Arab group and in maintaining the different Palestinian-Arab religious 
communities as divided groups). 
 123 See Gad Barzilai, Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics and the 
Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community, 34 ISR. L. REV. 425, 436 (2000) (“The state inherited the mandatory 
colonial recognition of religious communities or tribes, and has formally respected it so as not to be 
domestically and internationally delegitimized. Yet, by formalizing and legalizing the religious aspect of 
the minority, the minority’s other identities have been marginalized, enabling the State to better control 
it.”); see also  BARZILAI, supra  note 10, at 97, 107 (“State law excludes the [Palestinian-Arab] minority by 
framing it as religious groups that are entitled to a confined religious and juridical autonomy.”); Tessler, 
The Identity of Religious Minorities, supra note 55, at 359-60 (1978) (noting the fact that the Arabs in 
Israel are viewed as a religious minority). 
 124 During his first term as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin specifically stated that Arabs in Israel 
constituted only a cultural-religious minority rather than a political or national one, a statement that elicited 
criticism from Palestinian-Arab political leaders. Haddad et al., supra  note 120, at 93. 
 125 EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 76 (“While all Palestinians who are Israeli citizens share a common 
linguistic and ethnic background, the Jewish authorities tend to treat each religious group as culturally, 
economically and politically distinguishable.”). 
 126 Some churches operating in the State of Israel have been in fact directed and controlled by authorities 
in other Arab countries, even when such countries had no diplomatic relations with Israel. See Rubinstein, 
Law and Religion in Israel, supra  note 2, at 390. 
 127 See ISRAELI ICCPR REPORT , supra  note 4, at 227 (describing how the Christian communities actually 
maintain the highest degree of independence in conducting their internal affairs).  
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clergy who provide various religious services to their community members 
according to the wishes of the heads of the relevant religious community.  It is also 
worth noting that most of the property held by the different churches prior to the 
establishment of the State of Israel was retained in their possession.  This 
undoubtedly lenient and accommodating policy stems from the fact that from its 
establishment, Israel's relation with its Christian communities was tied up with its 
foreign policy towards the Christian West,128 something that eventually worked to 
shield local Christian communities from government intervention. 129 
¶38 On the other hand, the government’s policies regarding the Moslem 
community are genuinely different.  First, all Moslem qadis to the Shari’a courts 
are appointed by a special statutory committee.130  Although the committee has 
representatives from the Moslem community, its agenda was controlled by the 
Minister of Religions, today the Minister of Justice.131  In addition, local Imams are 
appointed by the state and are in essence state officials.  A substantial portion of 
Moslem religious endowments (waqf), regarded as absentee property, 132 was 
transferred to the hands of the Israeli government.133  The Moslem community is 
indubitably the largest Palestinian-Arab religious community in Israel, and is 
perceived as posing a security threat due to its religious affinity with the 
surrounding Arab countries.134  As a result, government agencies have endeavored 
to gain a stronger grip on the Moslem community in contrast to the regulation, or 
the lack of regulation, of the Christian communities.135 
¶39 The relationship existing between the Druze community and the Israeli 
government is completely different from both the Christian and Moslem 
communities.  With the establishment of the State of Israel, a close relationship was 
constructed between the Israeli government and the leadership of the Druze 
community which led to Druze male members being conscripted into the Israel 
Defense Forces.136  In due course, the Israeli establishment considered the Druze 
identity as a national identity and not a mere religious attribute, making the Druze 
                                                 
 128 See BIALER, supra  note 13, at 122 (“From the first, the problem of Christian communities in Israel 
was bound up and interrelated with the issue of Israel's relations with world church centers.”). 
 129 See RUBIN-PELED, supra  note 25, at 7. 
 130 Qadis Law, 5721-1961, 15 LSI 123 (1960-1961) (Isr.). 
 131 BARZILAI, supra  note 10, at 107; EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 77-78. 
 132 See Ilan Saban, Ha-Zekhuyot ha-Kibbutsiyot shel ha-Mi’ut ha-Aravi-Falestini: Ha-Yesh, ha-Ein  ve-
Tkhum  ha-Tabu [The Minority Rights of the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel: What Is, What Isn't and What Is 
Taboo], 26 IYUNEI MISHPAT  241, 282-85 (2002) (in Hebrew) (stating that government policy towards the 
Moslem community’s religious endowments was conducted with a clear view to weaken the community 
through diluting its power to control its property). 
 133  See KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS, supra  note 27, at 167-68. 
 134 EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 76 (“The Jewish majority generally considers the Muslims as the 
greatest security risk. Their religion is perceived as yet another bond with the surrounding Arab forces 
threatening Israel’s survival.”). 
 135 BARZILAI, supra  note 10, at 108 (“The state is not interested in having a professional non-Jewish 
juridical body [referring to the Moslem Sharia courts], which would be autonomous from direct state 
political control. The state is interested in a religious body with partial religious autonomy, the Sharia court, 
which in actuality is subject to supervision by Jewish Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox establishment in the 
Ministry for Religious Affairs.”). 
 136 See Laila Parsons, The Palestinian Druze in the 1947-1949 Arab Israeli War, in NATIONALISM, 
MINORITIES AND DIASPORAS: IDENTITIES AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  144 (Kirsten E. Schulze et al. 
eds., 1996). 
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community even more distinct from their fellow Palestinian-Arab citizens.  On 
these terms, the Druze community was regarded as the most favored minority in 
Israel and received full recognition as a separate and independent religious 
community shortly after the establishment of the State of Israel. 137  Consequently, 
the Druze religious courts became important political institutions controlled 
entirely by the Druze community, including the process of selecting judges.138 
¶40 This disparate treatment of the Israeli establishment toward the different 
Palestinian-Arab religious communities was to a great deal facilitated by 
maintaining the separate and private nature of such accommodations.  This 
separateness made it possible to apply separate policies among such communities, 
policies that because of the accommodation's private nature, were also "privatized" 
to suit pre-conceived governmental policies. 
B. Internal Re-Enforcements 
¶41 The paradigm of separateness is also strengthened as a result of the internal 
Palestinian-Arab minority conceptions of the nature of their religious 
accommodations.139  The discourse among community leaders, even those 
belonging to secular political parties,140 tends to focus on religious matters of the 
Palestinian-Arab minority as minority affairs, autonomous in nature and distinct 
from those of the Jewish majority. 141 
¶42 This tendency was evident immediately after the establishment of the State of 
Israel when calls were made for abolishing the millet system altogether.  
Representatives of the Moslem community argued that such a move would amount 
to a historical injustice, for when the Jews were a minority under Ottoman rule they 
were accorded exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to personal status.142  A 
similar argument was made by representatives of the Christian churches who also 
stressed the long-standing ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the country. 143 
                                                 
 137 Aharon Layish & Salman Hamud Fallah, Ha-Irgun ha-Edati shel ha-Druzim, Communal 
Organization of the Druzes, in HA-ARAVIM BE-YISRAEL: RETSIFUT VE-TMURA [THE ARABS IN ISRAEL: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE] 123 (1981) (in Hebrew). 
 138 EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 90-92. 
 139 See Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality, supra  note 85, at 194 ("After the founding of the 
State, the religious autonomy retained by the non-Jewish minorities has continued to be regarded, from the 
perspective of these communities, as a central element for their national cultural autonomy, representing, in 
a wider sense, a form of community autonomy."); Lisa Hajar, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Arab 
Women, Liberal Feminism and the Israeli State, MIDDLE E. REP . 207 (1998), available at  
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer207/lisa207.htm (“[A]s long as Israel is a Jewish state, the Muslim, Christian 
and Druze religious institutions will remain important sources of communal identity for Israel’s Arabs 
(women and men) since the civil state is not really ‘theirs.’”). 
 140 See Danny Rubinstein Ha-Shesa ha-Dati-Khiloni Bekerev ArvieiYisrael [The Religious-Secular Rift 
Among Israeli Arabs], in SHNATON DAT U-MEDINAH [STATE AND RELIGION YEARBOOK] 1993 89, 95 
(Avner Horvits ed., 1994) (in Hebrew) (noting that within the Palestinian-Arab community in Israel there is 
no “secular activism” in matters pertaining to family and social life and no real political agenda in this 
respect on behalf of the main political parties, not even the communist party that has traditionally had a 
strong national program).  
 141 EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 88 (noting how the Moslem Shari’a  courts through their Qadis worked 
to nourish the sense of their community’s sense of collectivity and separateness). 
 142 Haim H. Cohn, Religious Freedom and Religious Coercion in the State of Israel, in ISRAEL AMONG 
THE NATIONS 79, 94 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 1998). 
 143 Id. 
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¶43 The tendency was also evident when government authorities sought to 
introduce regulations that limited the application of certain religious norms or 
religiously sanctioned practices.  This was the case when government authorities 
took control of Moslem waqf property, 144 when polygamy was criminalized,145 
when the jurisdiction of the Shari'a and Christian courts over maintenance claims 
made by women against their husbands was made concurrent to civil courts instead 
of remaining exclusive,146 and when there was an initiative to abolish the practice of 
dowry among members of the Moslem community. 147 
¶44 The Palestinian-Arab religious leadership understandably internalized the 
group right perception with respect to their individual religious communities, 
because this perception helped to preserve and legitimize their power structure.148  
The political leadership on the other hand, contributed to the internalization process 
primarily through acquiescence.149  From their point of view, challenging existing 
religious authority may cause internal friction among community members, 
something that might jeopardize their political campaign for and among their 
constituencies.150  After all, patriarchy is still central to the social structure of the 
Palestinian-Arab society in Israel – a patriarchy that to a large extent is embedded 
and nourished by the existing religious institutions. 
C. A Caveat on Group Rights Qualifications 
¶45 Probably, the most peculiar feature about how the paradigm of separateness 
was constructed and re-enforced is that this process managed to take place without 
even inquiring whether what stands as the paradigm's most basic tenet is 
normatively valid; namely, whether the religious accommodations accorded to the 
Palestinian-Arab religious community in Israel, in their current form and context, 
can be viewed under democratic and liberal ideals as indeed autonomous and 
multicultural in nature.  As the analysis afforded here will demonstrate, such a 
qualification is in serious doubt.  However, the fact that the autonomy and 
multicultural perception persists only demonstrates how entrenched this basic tenet 
of the paradigm of separateness has become. 
                                                 
 144 See Michael M. Karayanni, Al ha-“Shelanu”: Rav-Tarbutiyut ba-Heksher ha-Aravi-Yehudi, [On the 
Concept of “Ours”: Multiculturalism with Respect to Arab-Jewish Relations], 27 IYUNEI MISHPAT  71, 97-
98 (2003) (in Hebrew).    
 145 See UZI BENZIMAN & ATALLAH MANSOUR, DAYAREI MISHNEH [SUBTENANTS] 136-37 (1992) (in 
Hebrew). 
 146 See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious and 
Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 200 (2003).  
 147 See EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 80 (noting the objection of the Moslem judges (Qadis) to the idea of 
reform through “the predominantly Jewish Knesset”).  
 148 David M. Neuhaus, Between Quiescence and Arousal: The Political Functions of Religion, A Case 
Study of the Arab Minority in Israel: 1948-1990 16 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem) (stating that traditional religious institutions within the Arab minority have sought 
to preserve traditional confessionalism “in their efforts to preserve the social structure from which their 
authority derives”).   
 149 See RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 276-77 (2004). 
 150 Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, Constitutional Transformation, Gender Equality, and 
Religious/National Conflict in Israel: Tentative Progress through the Obstacle Course, in THE GENDER OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 205, 224-25 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio -Marin eds., 2005). 
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¶46 This paper assumes that not all group-based normative entitlements qualify as 
“autonomous”, as “multicultural” or as “pluralistic” accommodations, at least when 
judged in terms of liberalism.151  For that to happen, certain conditions, or 
“qualifying factors”, must be met.  Indeed, in the literature dealing with 
multiculturalism, scholars have already touched on such qualifying factors when 
dealing with the question of whether a multicultural accommodation can be 
considered legitimate when it also entails the application of norms that violate basic 
conceptions of individual well-being.  In an effort to help differentiate between 
“good” and “bad” group-based entitlements, scholars have offered a basic 
classification between such “good” accommodations that entail “external 
protection” only (claims of the group against the larger society – such as when 
allocating a representation quota for a minority group in governmental bodies) and 
such “bad” group accommodations that entail “internal restrictions” and thus 
legitimize group practices that violate basic human rights (claims of the group 
against their own members – such as in the case of granting autonomy to a group 
whose norms systematically discriminate on the basis of gender).152  Some have 
argued that a group accommodation of the latter kind can in some cases be possible 
if the individual belonging to the group is offered the option to “exit” from the 
group, thereby relieving himself, or most probably herself, of the internal 
restrictions.153  Serious questions therefore arise as to whether the existing group 
accommodation granted to the Palestinian-Arab religious communities can qualify 
as a multicultural accommodation. 
¶47 The possibility of applying one’s religious law to his or her personal status is 
problematic in many respects, at least from a liberal point of view. 154  First, the 
individual member might be secular and thus not interested at all in conducting his 
or her matrimonial life under a religious regime.  The exclusive control of religious 
law in matters of marriage and divorce thus compels Israeli citizens to tolerate a 
body of norms that might be completely foreign to their personal beliefs.  Second, 
within the religious laws of the different religious communities there exist a 
number of norms that are discriminatory in nature, especially in terms of gender.  
In fact, many religious norms explicitly discriminate against women and work to 
preserve the internal patriarcha l hierarchy. 155 
¶48 One extreme example can be found in the Code of Family Law of the Greek 
Orthodox community, which is essentially a code compiled in the fourteenth 
century during the reign of the Byzantine Empire.156  The Code allows for only a 
limited number of reasons for divorce that are asymmetrically gendered.  For 
                                                 
 151 See Will Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 
81 (David Heyd ed., 1996). 
 152 WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP : A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 37 
(1995) (“[L]iberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness 
between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question 
and revise traditional authorities and practices.”). 
 153 See Oanagh Reitman, On Exit, in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND 
DIVERSITY 189 (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005). 
 154 See Rubinstein, State and Religion , supra  note 3, at 117; Bassli, supra  note 24, at 491, 516. 
 155 Frances Raday, Culture, Religion and Gender, 1 INT’L J. CONST . L. 663, 669-76 (2003). 
 156 See F.M. GOADBY, INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-RELIGIOUS PRIVATE LAW IN PALESTINE 134-35 
(1926). 
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example, under the Code a husband can petition the Greek Orthodox court for 
divorce if his wife slept outside of their house without his permission.  However, a 
wife cannot petition for divorce when the husband chooses to do the same without 
his wife’s consent.157  But the most intriguing aspect of the Code is the causes 
enumerated in a special section on circumstances in which divorce is not to be 
granted.  According to the relevant provision, a wife cannot petition for divorce in 
cases where her husband whipped her with a lash or hit her with a stick.  This of 
course is only a sample, albeit extreme in its content, of religious norms that do not 
treat men and women equally in matrimonial matters.  These are very severe 
“internal restrictions”.  Moreover, in the absence of a civil regime of marriage and 
divorce in Israel, it is also questionable whether there is an option to exit from the 
group, for there is simply nowhere to exit to. 
¶49 In this author’s view there is yet a more serious flaw in the position which 
views the religious authority granted to the different Palestinian-Arab religious 
communities in Israel as a sort of “autonomy” or a group right of a “multicultural” 
or “pluralistic” nature.  To be regarded as such, one fundamental qualifying factor 
also needs to be met. This qualifying factor concerns the “will” of the group itself.  
It is essential that the group subject to the accommodation is interested in the type 
of accommodation granted. Otherwise, and especially if the accommodation is in 
the interest of a minority within that group, the group accommodation is at best just 
a group accommodation and at worst a product of coercion.  This fundamental 
qualifying factor is derived not only from basic notions of justice,158 but also from 
the rationale of having multicultural and autonomous accommodations in the first 
place. 
¶50 If such accommodations are justified in terms of serving the interests of the 
group members themselves, whether because individuals are embedded in their 
community or because they need their community in order to realize their 
individual virtues and aspirations,159 it becomes essential that the group 
accommodation accords with their interests instead of those belonging to some 
minority group within them. 
¶51 Take for example the case of two major religious communities: the Greek 
Orthodox and the Moslem.  The Greek Orthodox community is controlled by a 
group of a foreign clergy from Greece, who can barely speak Arabic, the mother 
tongue of the local Palestinian-Arab Greek Orthodox community.160  Judges are 
                                                 
 157 Michael M. Karayanni, “Yehudit ve-Demokratit” - Rav-Tarbutiyut ve-ha-Eda ha-Yevanit-Ortodoksit 
[Jewish and Democratic: Multiculturalism and the Greek Orthodox Community], in HA-KONFLIKT : DAT U-
MEDINA BE -YISRAEL [THE CONFLICT , RELIGION AND STATE IN ISRAEL] 227 (Nachum Langental & Shuki 
Friedman eds., 2002) (in Hebrew). 
 158 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 34 (1990) (“For a norm to be 
just, everyone who follows it must in principle have an effective voice in its consideration and be able to 
agree to it without coercion.”). 
 159 See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE  (1989); Avishai Margalit & Moshe 
Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, in 61 SOCIAL RESEARCH: AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY 
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 491 (Arien Mack ed., 1994). 
 160 DAPHNE TSIMHONI, CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK SINCE 1948, AN 
HISTORICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL STUDY 37 (1993) (observing how the Greek Orthodox Arab 
community “considered the Greek upper hierarchy an alien element that has usurped the spiritual authority 
of the church and its property from the indigenous Christians”). See also  ROBERT BRENTON BETTS, 
CHRISTIANS IN THE ARAB EAST , A POLITICAL STUDY 44 (revised ed. 1978). 
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appointed to the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical courts at the sole discretion of the 
Church’s administration without any input or supervision from either state 
authorities or community members.161  It is worthwhile to mention that this 
situation has existed in the past in a number of other Middle Eastern countries, such 
as Egypt, but was changed through reform that abolished foreign control of local 
churches.162  However, calls from the local Palestinian-Arab community for change 
have not been very successful, neither before nor after the establishment of the 
State of Israel.163 
¶52 Thus, serious questions arise as to whether the existing accommodation 
granted to this community is really autonomy or multicultural given the fact that its 
form and practice run counter to the wishes of the constituency.  Moslems’ 
community affairs have been handled over the years by qadis and imams coming 
from the ranks of the community itself, but state authorities have applied different 
control policies over the handling of community affairs.164  This policy was evident 
in the appointment process of such religious figures to their posts, always 
conducted under the close supervision of government authorities.165  A request 
made by Moslem leaders to have a Moslem as head of Moslem affairs in what was 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs was denied as the position was “passed from one 
Jew to another.”166  But most probably, what really curtailed the community’s 
control over its own affairs was the state authorities’ handling of the Moslem 
religious endowments (waqf property).167  Because various members of the 
Supreme Moslem Council, the body that administered such property in Mandatory 
Palestine, have left the country, this property was characterized as absentee 
property via legal constructs.168  In turn this made it possible for the State of Israel, 
through the authority granted to the governmental organ, the Custodian of Absentee 
Property, to take over such property. 169  Thus, it is once again questionable whether 
the jurisdiction and authority granted to the Moslem community in Israel is really 
autonomy or a genre of multiculturalism, even outside of the question of internal 
restrictions and the option to exit. 
                                                 
 161 Maoz, Religious Human Rights, supra  note 2, at 357, 364; Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra  note 
2, at 390. 
 162 Karayanni, supra  note 157, at 238-40. 
 163 See Daphne Tsimhoni, The Greek Orthodox Community in Jerusalem and the West Bank 1948-1978: 
A Profile of Religious Minority in a National State, 23 ORIENT  281 (1982) (observing it is because of this 
distance between the local Greek Orthodox community and the Greek clergy that associations and clubs, 
governed by community members, developed among the Greek Orthodox community); Daphne Tsimhoni, 
Continuity and Change in Communal Autonomy: The Christian Communal Organizations in Jerusalem 
1948-80, 22 MIDDLE E. STUD. 390, 398 (1986). 
 164 See RUBIN-PELED, supra  note 25. 
 165 See supra text accompanying notes 130-135. 
 166 Tessler, supra  note 51, at 265. 
 167 See PERETZ, supra  note 116, at 126 (noting how the appointment of a Jewish official by the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs to control waqf property and to be in charge of other functions regarding the Moslem 
community “aroused much resentment” among the Moslem community religious leadership). 
 168 KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS, supra  note 27, at 167-68. 
 169 Id. It was once held that the Custodian of Absentee Property transferred the income received from 
administering Moslem waqf to the Ministry of Religious Affairs who in turn distributed back to community 
members according to the recommendation of an advisory committee. See Rubinstein, Law and Religion , 
supra  note 2, at 389. However, as things turned out, only a small portion of such income went back to the 
Moslem community. See RUBIN-PELED, supra  note 25. 
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¶53 In light of this discussion it is thus remarkable how reference is still made to 
the religious accommodations of the Palestinian-Arab religious communities in 
terms of an autonomous jurisdiction and a genre of multiculturalism.  This only 
demonstrates how overwhelming the paradigm of separateness has become.  
V. THE PARADIGM OF SEPARATENESS AND ITS NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
¶54 At the core of the paradigm of separateness identified here stands the claim 
that religious accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab minority are a matter of 
minority group accommodations.  Yet, the same “accommodations” with respect to 
the Jewish majority are considered to be a dictate of the Jewish nature of the State 
of Israel.  The first case concerns the “private” issues of minorities, and the second 
case concerns the “public” nature of the State of Israel.  
¶55 My argument in this respect goes further and suggests that this paradigm of 
separateness carries with it a number of normative implications.  In the interest of 
succinctness, I will examine four different implications rather briefly. 170  The first 
implication is dominance.  The official Jewish nature of the State of Israel and the 
Palestinian-Arab community’s internalization of the paradigm of separateness with 
respect to religious accommodations created a legal environment with interesting 
consequences.  This environment made it possible to devise and shape, first and 
foremost according to the interests of the Jewish community, public norms with 
religious implications as well as legal reforms intended to benefit individual 
members.   I chose to term this type of normative implication “the dominance 
effect.”  This notion of dominance can be found in the Israeli adoption law, 
particularly the stipulation that demands the adoptee be of the same religion as the 
adopting parents.171  This strict and uncompromising requirement was originally 
implemented in Section 3 of the Adoption of Children Law, 1960, and was strongly 
influenced by the sensitivity of the Jewish community to the possibility that Jewish 
children could be adopted by non-Jewish parents.172  The dominance was so strong 
that this norm became the law of the land while overlooking the possibility that the 
local Palestinian-Arab community might not be equally opposed to inter-religious 
adoption among their community members.   
¶56 The second implication is what I chose to call “the distancing effect.”  The 
paradigm of separateness has a distancing effect on the individual members of the 
Palestinian-Arab religious communities when it comes to liberal norms of the 
individual-secular welfare of these members.  In order to reach the individual 
member and care for his, but mostly her, individual liberal rights, the paradigm 
requires a justification of the infiltration of the outer and well-guarded limits of a 
minority group’s existing autonomy on behalf of such an individual. 173  This barrier 
                                                 
 170 For a detailed study in this respect see Michael M. Karayanni, A Group of One’s Own: A Dialectical 
Legal Analysis of the Religious Accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 6 UCLA  J. 
ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. (forthcoming 2007). 
 171  Michael M. Karayanni, A Historical Analysis of the Religious Matching Requirement under Israeli 
Adoption Law, 2 PALESTINIAN SOC’Y & HIST . REV. (forthcoming 2007) (in Arabic). 
 172 Id. 
 173 The effect of group-based norms on individual members has received particular attention in the 
literature dealing with multiculturalism. Therefore, it has become particularly important to think of 
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does not exist within the Jewish community, for once again its religious 
accommodations are not perceived as a minority accommodation of an autonomous 
and multicultural nature.  On the contrary, many of the religious accommodations 
within the Jewish community are viewed as a minority imposition made on the 
majority who prefer freedom from religious norms and have strong secular 
tendencies, or at least support the right to choose in regard to the ir own religious 
accommodations.174  Thus in the case of the Jewish community, change in religious 
accommodations can occur once the liberal norm is preferred over the religious 
norm.  In the case of the Palestinian-Arab community there is an additional step 
before this can happen: whether a group accommodation that is considered to be 
autonomous ought to be changed by official state organs, whether by the courts or 
the Knesset. 
¶57 Examining scholarly historical analysis of the overall tendencies of courts 
and government agencies to intervene in religious practices within each of the 
communities is telling.  The tendency has been to curtail and restrict the 
jurisdiction of the Jewish community’s religious institutions and its ability to apply 
religious norms, whereas the tendency with respect to the Palestinian-Arab 
community was one of reluctance to interfere and effectuate changes.175  A more 
tangible example is illustrative: Jewish wives gained the legal right to bring a 
maintenance claim against their husbands before a civil court in 1953, but the same 
right was granted to Moslem and Christian women only in 2001.176 
¶58 The third implication concerns the internal dynamics that arose within the 
Palestinian-Arab community as a result of both its perception of the nature and type 
of religious accommodations accorded to its different religious communities and 
the national conflict that exists between the State of Israel and the Palestinian-Arab 
community as a whole.  On a number of occasions, calls for liberal reforms from 
within the Palestinian-Arab community were suppressed for fear of creating 
internal conflicts within the religious communities that would eventually weaken 
the national struggle.177  This effect is termed herewith as “the internal barrier 
                                                                                                                                                 
mechanisms that can work to lessen this group-individual tension. See, e.g., MINORITIES WITHIN 
MINORITIES (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005);  SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 9-24 (1999); Leslie Green, Internal Minorities and Their Rights, in 
THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, 257, 258 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
 174 See supra  text accompanying notes 76-80. 
 175 Compare Steinberg, supra  note 23, at 100-101 (“Over time, the combination of religious/ideological 
and political/cultural factors gradually led to a weakening of the consociational structure, and the clash 
between secular and religious norms has become particularly pronounced. The expanded authority and 
scope taken on by the secular court system in the past decade has contributed to the undermining of the 
status quo. Under the influence of Judge Aharon Barak (Chief Justice of the High Court of Appeal [sic]), 
the courts have entered into areas and assumed powers that had, in the past, been rejected by the secular 
courts as outside their areas of jurisdiction.”), with EDELMAN, supra  note 12, at 87 (“For their part, the 
Jewish majority has not been anxious to upset Muslim sensibilities on matters of personal status. There 
have been only isolated legal actions to bring the Shari’a  Courts into strict compliance with Israeli 
law…On matters of personal status, the Jewish elite is more concerned with modernizing the practices of 
their fellow Jews who came to Israel from Arab lands. The governing elite’s priorities are reflected in the 
more restricted jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Courts and the greater administrative-legal supervision of 
personal status practices within the Jewish population.”). 
 176 Compare § 4 Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139 
(1952-53) with § 3(b1) of the Court of Family Affairs Law, 1995, S.H. 1537 (enacted in 2001, S.H. 1810).  
 177 Michael M. Karayanni, Ontologiya Hukatit le-Hesderei ha-Dat Bekerev ha-Mi’ut ha-Aravi be-
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effect.”  An extreme example can be found in the notes of a Palestinian-Arab 
sociologist who studied the phenomena of the murder of Palestinian-Arab women 
for the alleged shame they caused to their family or clan (“honor killing”).178  One 
argument she encountered, which was supported by community leaders, was that 
this was not the time for raising such an issue, even though the same community 
leaders stood against the phenomenon. 179 
¶59 The fourth normative implication of the paradigm of separateness is 
genuinely different from the previous three because it implies the possibility of 
greater reform in the religious accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab 
community.  These accommodations differ from those granted to the Jewish 
community, meaning it may be possible to make such accommodations susceptible 
to different sets of considerations and norms than those relevant to the Jewish 
community.  This implication should be emphasized given the fact that, as the 
socio-political reality that exists in Israel demonstrates, there are more spheres in 
which the Palestinian-Arab community can move for more liberal reforms than 
those in the Jewish community.  The paradigm of separateness should work to 
facilitate such reforms, for it also implies that the impediments to reform within the 
Jewish community do not similarly impede the Palestinian-Arab community.  A 
meaningful precedent can be found in the basic legal instrument regulating 
surrogacy agreements in Israel, the Surrogate Mother Agreement (Approval of the 
Agreement and the Status of the Child) Law, 1996.180  This enactment was heavily 
influenced by Jewish halacha, especially in determining the kind of preconditions 
necessary for making legal and valid surrogacy agreements.181  One such 
precondition is the requirement contained in Section 2(5) of the Law under which 
the carrying mother must be of the same religion of the intended mother.182  
However, because the dictates of the Jewish halacha are irrelevant to the non-
Jewish population, the same section continues to prescribe that the statutory 
committee in charge of approving surrogacy agreements can deviate from the 
religious matching requirement “where all parties to the agreement are non-
Jews.”183  Thus, one is also able to imagine that a less restrictive religious matching 
                                                                                                                                                 
Yisrael: Rashei Prakim le-Diyun, [A Constitutional Ontology of the Religious Accommodations of the Arab 
Minority in Israel: General Topics for Discussion], in KHASAMIM BIFNEI SHIVYON; HA-ARAVIM BE-
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 178 Manar Hasan, Ha-Politika shel ha-Kavod: Ha-Pariarkhiya, ha-Medina ve-Retsakh Nashim Beshem 
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VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 181, 182 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005). 
 179 Id.    
 180 Carmel Shalev, Halakha and Patriarchal Motherhood – An Anatomy of the New Israeli Surrogacy 
Law, 32 ISR. L. REV. 51, 60 n.26 (1998) (“It should be noted that the terms ‘surrogate motherhood’ or 
‘surrogacy’ are not used in the Hebrew title of the law. If the title had been literally translated it would have 
read as ‘Embryo Carrying Agreements.’”). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 66-67. 
 183 Surrogate Mother Agreement (Approval of the Agreement and the Status of the Child) Law, 1996, 
S.H. 1577, § 2(5).  
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requirement can apply in adoptions taking place in Israel among adopters and 
adoptees from the Palestinian-Arab community.  For once again the place and 
meaning of religion in preserving the national unity and interests of the Palestinian-
Arab minority are separate and different from those relevant for the Jewish 
community.  However, it remains to be seen how far the Palestinian-Arab minority 
will be able to pursue this path for change and reform.  As previously discussed, 
external and internal forces have worked to enforce separateness among the 
different Palestinian-Arab religious communities.  This state of being is also 
influenced by a patriarchal social structure. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶60 The discussion in this article purports to offer a legal diagnosis of how 
religious accommodations of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel are perceived 
through dominant views.  This article has suggested that a legal paradigm is 
apparent in matters concerning the Palestinian-Arab religious communities, which 
is perceived as an autonomous accommodation for a minority group.  As the 
preceding discussion endeavored to show, the paradigm of separateness is closely 
linked to Israeli constitutional and political conceptions.  However, it is equally 
important to note that if these arguments prove to be valid in the Israeli context, 
they might also be helpful in understanding the role religion plays within the state 
in a number of other countries in which the majority religion acquires some form of 
constitutional and political dominance. This could be especially true in such states 
that have recognized some form of relationship between religion and state that have 
caused certain tensions to evolve between the different groups. 
